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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-REORGANIZATION UNDER SECTION 77B-ErET ON CONDITIONAL
VENDOR oF THE DEBToR,-The debtor,' a New York corporation, filed a petition for

reorganization under Section 77B of the B'ankruptcy Act.2 The petition was approved
by the district court and jurisdiction taken. Subsequently motions were made to
recover chattels sold to the debtor on conditional sales contracts on which it was
in default. The motions were granted. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, that
since under the New York Conditional Sales Act the conditional vendor retained
title.and not a lien, the property was not subject to the reorganization proceedings
and could be immediately retaken. Orders affirmed. In re Lake's Latmdry Inc.,
79 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 144 (1935).
A federal court having properly assumed jurisdiction of a reorganization proceeding acquires, under Section 77B (a), 4 "exclusive jurisdictionu of the debtor and

its property wherever located." The term "property", employed in a broad significance in the Bankruptcy Act,0 connotes every asset,7 every interest which the
law regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition.8 This appears clearly to
embrace the rights of a conditional vendee which represent the entire beneficial

interest in the property, the vendor retaining a bare security titleP To suppose that
the buyer's rights lie not in the property itself but in contract is a mistake fraught

with serious practical consequences.10 The conditional sale results in the creation
of a divided property interest," vesting in the vendee, ab initio, a property right
1. The Act provides that in the reorganization proceedings the corporation shall be
referred to as a "debtor." Bawx uxcy ACT § 77B (a), 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 207(a) (1934).
2. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1934).
3. N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1922) §§ 60-S0(i).
4. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207(a) (1934).
5. The court obtains complete jurisdiction over a res in possession of the debtor with
the exclusive right to determine whether another has any right, title or interest therein.
In re 1030 North Dearborn Bldg. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 972 (E. D. Ill. 1935). Jurisdiction of
a district court may validly be extended over the entire United States. Continental Ill. Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648 (1935). For a complete
discussion of the jurisdictional question see Gerdes, Jurisdiction of the Court in Proceedings
under Section 77B (1935) 4 BRooxLryx L. Rzv. 237.
6. Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 247 Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); In rc
Lowman, 8 F. Supp. 886 (N. D. Ind. 1934); see Comment (1935) 4 Fomrmmr L. Rzv. 307.
7. In re Baudoine, 96 Fed. 536 (S. D. N. Y. 1899), rev'd on other grounds, 101 Fed. 574
(C. C. A. 2d, 1900); In re Wright, 157 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907).
S. Martin & Earle v. Maxwell, 86 S. C. 1, 67 S. E. 962 (1910).
9. Universal Credit Co. v. Mamminga, 214 Iowa 1135, 243 N. W. 513 (1932);
Greenlease-Lied Motors v. Sadler, 216 Iowa 302, 249 N. W. 383 (1933); Ratchford v.
Cayuga County Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 159 App. Div. 525, 145 N. Y. Supp. 83
t
(4th Dep't 1913), aff
d, 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447 (1916); see 1 WILrs-o:.;, S.nS (2d
ed. 1924) § 334.
10. Id. at § 330; VoLD, SALES (1931) 274. A conditional vendor wrongfully retaking
property is not merely liable for damages for breach of contract, but is guilty of conversion. Berge v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp., 57 S. D. 306, 232 N. W. 45 (1930); see
I WmIrsrozq, SALEs § 333.
11. See Vorm, SArES 271.
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sometimes termed a "special property."'12 Under the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act in force in New York' s and governing the rights of the instant parties,14 the
15
vendee, in addition, acquires an equity of redemption after default, itself a property
6
right' sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. This equity under certain circumstances
by automatic operation of the statute 17 and at all times upon seasonable demand by
the vendee' s can not be defeated without a retaking and sale. These elements
together with the fact that the vendee has to bear the entire risk of loss'0 until after
actual retaking indicate substantial ownership.
Incident to its exclusive jurisdiction the court is further vested, by virtue of Section
77B (c) (10),20 with authority to stay the continuation or initiation of any proceeding
"to enforce any lien on the [debtor's] estate until after final decree." 21 In interpreting
this as well as the previous subdivision it should be considered that the purpose of the
entire Bankruptcy Act being remedial it is to be accorded a liberal construction,22
one which will, while remaining consistent with the language employed, achieve the
ultimate goal of the legislation.23 The purpose of Section 77B is, briefly, the continuation of the debtor in business in contrast with the purpose of ordinary bankruptcy
proceedings, liquidation. 24 Mindful of this, it must appear that the claimant's
retention of the legal title to equipment indispensable to the carrying on of the
debtor's business need not of itself preclude the court from holding the claim in
its essential nature a lien. A contrary view, regarding the bare legal title as the
sole criterion, would prevent the staying of foreclosure proceedings even in the
case of a chattel mortgage, 25 the mortgagee acquiring the legal title20 and the mortgagor retaining merely an equity of redemption. However, conceding by inference
12. Hyland v. Hyland, 278 Mass. 112, 179 N. E. 612 (1932); see Note (1931)
A. L. R. 799; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 330.
13. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1922) §§ 60-80(i).

73

The Uniform Conditional Sales Act

has also been adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
14. The nature of the property right resulting from a conditional sale or chattel
mortgage is to be determined by local law. Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266 (1891);
In re American Steel Supply Syndicate, Inc., 256 Fed. 876 (E. D. Mich. 1919); Midwest
Production Co. v. Doerner, 70 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934); Sweeney v. Medler,
78 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
15. N. Y. PzRS. PROP. LAW (1922) § 78; see VOLD, SALES 280.

16. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U. S.
648 (1935); In re Argyle-Lake Shore Bldg. Corp., 78 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935)
(equity of redemption after tax sale).
17. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1922) § 79.
18. Id. § 80.
19. Id. § 80(g).
20. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207(c) (10) (1934).
21. "Jurisdiction to enjoin and stay any suit to enforce a lien was expressly conferred
upon the judge approving the petition." In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734, 736
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935).

22. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); In re Lowman,
8 F. Supp. 886 (N. D. Ind. 1934).
23. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
24. In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Prudence
Bonds Corp., 77 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Grand Boulevard Inv. Co. v. Strauss,
78 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
25. Section 77B, however, contains no limitation which excludes property subject to
a lien or mortgage. In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 77 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
26. Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873); Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 327, 24 N. I.
477 (1890).
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the applicability of the statute to this latter transaction, the instant court hastened
to point out the well recognized distinction existing between chattel mortgages and
conditional sales. Unquestionably such a distinction in form does exist.
Hence
statutes specifically applicable to one transaction are not generally held to apply to
the other, 28 though there are exceptions.2 9 However, looking to the substance rather
than the form, since it is the nature of the property right presently existing, not
the means of its acquisition, which is the determinant here, all material distinctions
disappear 8 0 Both chattel mortgagee and conditional vendor hold title for the sole
purpose of security and the right of either may be extinguished by payment. 0 '
Basically every conditional sale has two aspects: (1) a present completed sale with
(2) a retention of title for security. 32 This is borne out by the absolute right of the
vendee to the legal title upon payment without any further consent of the vendors
and by his equally irrevocable liability for any resulting deficiency upon retaking and
sale by the vendor in compliance with the statute. 34 In the last analysis this
virtually absolute liability for the price with the retention of title as security for
payment gives rise to what is essentially a mortgage. 35 As was said by Dean
Bogert, draftsman of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, "B'y declaring the conditional sale nothing but a chattel mortgage in disguise . . . the result would
ultimately have been the same."'3 6 Had the court adopted this view of the transaction, after having adjudged the vendor a creditor3 7 of the debtor within the
meaning of Section 77B (b) (10),38 it could have dealt with it as with any secured
creditor whose claim is no less amenable to reorganization proceedings than is an
unsecured debt. 39 Furthermore the provisions of Section 77B (b) (9),4 ° authorizing
the "modification of liens, indentures, or other similar instruments, the curing or
waiver of defaults," as well as the extension of the maturity or scaling down of
debts, provide ample means for effecting rehabilitation, without running afoul of
the "due process" clause of the Constitution4 ' by setting up a title adverse to that
27. Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
28. Ibid.; 1 WInusroze, SALEs § 337.
29. Chattel mortgage recording statutes were applied to conditionai sales in the
following instances: Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S. W. 498 (1924); In, re
Cullen, 24 F. (2d) 593 (E .D. Mich. 1927); Purity Cream Co. v. Hays, 4 S. W. (2d) 1056
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
30. John Hetherington & Sons v. Rudisill, 28 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Mercier
v. Nashua Buick Co., 84 N. H. 59, 146 Atl. 165 (1929) ; see 1 WLr.sron', S.VS §§ 330, 337.
31. Walker v. Houston, 215 Cal. 742, 12 P. (2d) 952 (1932).
32. Heyman Co. v. Buck, 221 Mlich. 225, 190 N. W. 631 (1922); Merrier v. Nashua
Buick Co., 84 N. H. 59, 146 Atl. 165 (1929); see Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 304, 305;
Williston, The Progress of the Law (1921)

34 HaRv. L. Rrv. 741, 767.

33. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAw (1922) § 72(d); Walker v. Houston, 215 Cal. 742, 12 P.
(2d) 952 (1932); see Vora, SALEs 277.
34.

N.Y. PERs.PROP. LAw (1922)

§ 80(b).

35. Cartwright v. C. I. T. Corp., 253 Ky. 690, 70 S.W. (2d) 388 (1934); Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. v. Wieselberg, 230 Mlich. 15, 203 N. W. 160 (1925); Cutting v. Whittemore, 72 N. H. 107, 54 A. 1098 (1903) ; see 1 WiLmsro,;, S.uxzs §§ 330, 337.
36. 2A UsroaRm LAws Ax-r. (1924) 59.
37. In re Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ohio 1935); In re Burgmeter
Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 902 (S. D. Ill.1935).
F. Supp. 719 (N. D. Cal. 1935).

38.
39.
Supp.
40.
41.

Contra: In re Ideal Laundry, Inc., 10

48 SrAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207(b) (10) (1934).
Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); In re Burgh, 7 F.
184 (N. D. IMI.1933).
48 SrTx. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207(b) (9) (1934).
U. S. Coxs-. Amend. V.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

of the conditional vendor. 42 Having, however, preferred a legalistic to a realistic
aspect of the transaction the instant court, as a court of equity, might still have
sought to preserve an opportunity for reorganization by availing itself of the remedy
suggested in In re Ideal Laundry, Inc. 43 That case, presenting an identical fact
situation, likewise upheld the right of the conditional vendor to possession but the
court sought, in the exercise of its discretion, to afford an opportunity for reorganization by staying the right to repossession for sixty days. Even such compromise
measures seem commendable in contrast with the destructive effect of the instant
44
holding upon all efforts toward reorganization.
BrLLs AND NOTES-CNSIDERATION-FAILURE TO PAY STOCK TRANSFER TAx.-The
plaintiff brought action on a negotiable promissory note made to him by C in payment
for 3,000 shares of stock. The defendants, the personal representatives of C, now
deceased, pleaded as a defense that no transfer tax stamps had been affixed to the
certificates nor to any memorandum of sale as required by Section 278 of the Tax
Law. 1 Held, no recovery can be had upon a promissory note, the consideration for
which was the transfer of unstamped certificates. Judgment affirmed. Wylie v.
Addoms, 268 N. Y. 160, 197 N. E. 180 (1935).
The statutes imposing stock transfer taxes are very broad, and include virtually
every kind of instrument or right in the nature of stock. 2 The Massachusetts,8
42. The constitutionality of Section 77B can no longer be questioned. In re Central
Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.
(2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Grand Boulevard Inv. Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935); In re Pierce-Arrow Sales Corp., 10 F. Supp. 776 (W. D. N. Y. 1935); cf.
Continental Ill.
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. &Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U. S.648 (1935).
Due process is not denied. No property is taken, but rather claims are scaled down to
facilitate reorganization. In re Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S. D. Ohio 1935).

43.

10 F. Supp. 719 (N. D. Cal. 1935).

Injunction may issue to preserve jurisdiction

until the object of the proceeding is accomplished). Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U. S.648 (1935); In re Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.
(2d) 662 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
44. All claims or interests of whatever character were intended to be brought within
the proceedings to accomplish its purpose. In re Burgmeister Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 902
(S. D. Ill.
1935) (conditional sale).
1. N. Y. TAX LAW (1935) § 270. Similar statutes are: PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 72, §§ 2041, 2061; MASS. ANx. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 64, §§ 1, 3; S.C. CoD
(Michie, 1932) § 2525, subd. 3; 48 STAT. 206, 26 U. S. C. A. § 902b (1933). The stock

transfer tax is a stamp tax paid by the affixing and cancelling of stamps. It has been held
in New York and Pennsylvania that the stamps may be affixed to the certificates, and not
to the agreement, in the case of an agreement for the future sale and delivery of stock.
Bean v. Flint, 204 N. Y. 153, 97 N. E. 490 (1912); Waddle v. Cabana, 220 N. Y. 18, 114
N. E. 1054 (1917); Smyth v. Pure Ice Co. 193 App. Div. 479, 184 N. Y. Supp. 305 (2d
Dep't 1920) ; Alexander v. Soulas, 269 Pa. 423, 112 At]. 538 (1921).
2. See Note (1913) 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 585. The following was held not to constitute
a transfer under § 270 of the N. Y. TAx LAW: Travis v. American Cities Co., 192 App, Div.
16, 182 N. Y. Supp. 394 (1st Dep't 1920), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 510, 135 N. E. 896 (1922)
(transfer of corporate stock as collateral to secure a bond issue) ; Noble v. Haff, 172 N. Y.
Supp. 139 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (an order by plaintiff on a broker to deliver certain stock to
defendant's testator also a broker, and a written receipt in general terms by testator for
the stock do not on their face constitute a transfer of stock); see Cooper v. Gossett, 237
App. Div. 700, 701, 262 N. Y. Supp. 425, 427 (1st Dep't 1933), rev'd on other grounds,
263 N. Y. 491, 189 N. E. 562 (1934).
3. MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 64, § 8.
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New York, 4 and Pennsylvania, 5 statutes hold that no taxable transfer of stock, on
which the tax is unpaid at the time of the transfer can be made the basis of any action
or legal proceeding, and no proof thereof can be offered or received in evidence in
any court.6 These statutes7 impose upon the transferor the duty of paying the tax
by affixing and cancelling the tax stamps8 and merely bar actions brought by the
transferor 9 ; suits by the transferee are not within their purview.' 0 Consistently
with this interpretation the courts have held that a donee can prove a gift of stock
although no stamps were affixed thereto.n
It is well settled that the failure to pay the tax does not prevent the passing of
title,'2 because the transfer is not void, but the violation of the statute merely bars
the enforcement of rights based on such transfer and makes the transferor subject to
punishment13 Thus the courts in interpreting the statutes have held that the
purchase price of stock cannot be recovered, 14 if the tax was not paid at the time the
contract was made;' 5 the seller of stock under an instalment contract cannot sue
the purchaser on the contract for failure to pay instalments where the tax was not
paid at the time of the contract.' 6 However, where there is an executory agreement
for the purchase and sale of stock upon a contingency which the defendant refuses
to perform, if the plaintiff elects to treat the stock as the property of the defendant,
4. N. Y. TAx LAW (1922) § 278.
5. PA. STAT. A=a. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2102.
6. There is no such provision in the federal or South Carolina statutes.
7. MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 64, § 1; N. Y. Ttx: LAw (1935) § 270;
PA. STAT. Awx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2061.
8. 48 STAT. 206, 26 U. S. C. A. § 902b (1933) places the tax on the seller or transferor,
but under U. S. TREAs. REG. 71, art. 136 (1932), both transferor and transferee of stock
are responsible for affixing and cancelling the stamps.
9. Phelps-Stokes Estates v. Nixon, 222 N. Y. 93, 118 N. E. 241 (1917); Sheridan v.
Tucker, 145 App. Div. 145, 129 N. Y. Supp. 18 (4th Dep't 1911).
10. Hall v. Davis, 95 Misc. 315, 159 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (unstamp-d stock
certificate introduced in evidence to prove a violation of § 277 of N. Y. T,%-X
]L,w) ; Matter
of Sullivan, 133 Misc. 758, 234 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Surr. Ct. 1929); In re Connen's Estate,
282 Pa. 555, 128 Atl. 503 (1925); South Hills Trust Co. v. Baker, 83 Pa. Super. 243 (1924).
But cf. Dinnean v. Dinnean, 90 Misc. 121, 152 N. Y. Supp. 587 (Sup. Ct. 1915), a'd, 171
App. Div. 906, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1st Dep't 1915).
11. Matter of Borst, 222 App. Div. 707, 224 N. Y. Supp. 761 (3d Dep't 1927), afld
248 N. Y. 556, 162 N. E. 523 (1928) (donee allowed to introduce unstamped stock certificate
in evidence to prove gift).
12. Sheridan v. Tucker, 145 App. Div. 145, 129 N. Y. Supp. 18 (4th Dep't 1911); I& re
Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 Atl. 503 (1925); Rogers v. Ballenberg, 63 F. (2d) 730
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934); see Bean v. Flint, 204 N. Y. 153, 157, 158, 97 N. E. 490, 491 (1912).
13. Sm M1 ss. A-m. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 64, § 15; N. Y. Tx LVW (1932)
§§ 272, 277; PA. STAT. Axe. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2064.
14. Sheridan v. Tucker, 145 App. Div. 145, 129 N. Y. Supp. 18 (4th Dep't 1911).
15. New York has held that the fact that the failure to affix stamps was due to inadvertence and ignorance does not relieve the transferor, and the vendor cannot afterward affix

a stamp and acquire a right to recover the purchase price. Sheridan v. Tucker, 145 App.
Div. 145, 129 N. Y. Supp. 18 (4th Dep't 1911) ; see Phillips v. Grossman, 76 Misc. 497, 499,
135 N. Y. Supp. 567, 569 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Matter of Raleigh, 75 Misc. SS, 57, 134 N. Y.
Supp. 684, 685 (Surr. Ct. 1911). MAss. Axx. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 64, § 8,
allows the excise to be paid at a later time where the omission wnas due to accident, mistake,
or inadvertence and without intent to evade and, if so paid, it has the same legal effect
as if the excise had been paid at the time of the transfer.
16. Phillips v. Grossman, 76 Misc. 497, 135 N. Y. Supp. 567 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
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the plaintiff may recover although no stock transfer tax was paid.17 The reason
assigned for this apparent inconsistency is that there was no actual delivery and no
physical transfer of the stock from the plaintiff to the defendant. Hence the change
of title is not a transfer of stock within the meaning of Section 278 of the Tax Law.' 8
The question of whether or not recovery may be had on a promissory note the
consideration for which was the transfer of an unstamped stock certificate did not
come before the court until the case of Cooper v. Gossett,"9 decided in 1932. The
Appellate Division decided that such an action could not be maintained but the Court
of Appeals 20 did not consider it necessary to decide this question and reversed on other
grounds. As a result the case at bar represents the first pronouncement of the Court
of Appeals on the point, and clearly holds that a promissory note given in consideration
of the transfer of unstamped stock certificates can not be enforced between the immediate parties. Had this been an action to recover the purchase price based on a
contract for the sale of such stock, there would have been no doubt as to what the
courts would have held. 2 1 The novelty of the problem in the instant case found its
inception in Section 50 of the Negotiable Instruments Law; 2 2 which reads "Every
negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration." It is true that a promissory note imports a consideration and in
an action between the immediate parties the duty is on the defendant in the first
instance to overcome the presumption by pleading and proof, but once this is done
the burden of establishing the consideration upon the whole case rests with the
plaintiff.2 Thus in the instant case the defendant was properly allowed to prove
his alleged defense, that the consideration for the note, or the "basis" for the note,
was the transfer of unstamped stock certificates, and as a result the plaintiff could
no longer sustain his action. Whether this decision would be applicable to a case
where the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity is questionable.2 4 However, under the facts of this case the result was logically sound and
easily predictable from a study of the court's previous decisions.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT

DOMAIN-POWER oF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO

CONDEMN FOR SLUM CLEARANCE PROJECT.-The United States Public Works Administration sought to condemn certain property under the section of the N.I.R.A.
authorizing the use of the power of eminent domain' to provide for the erection of
17. Phelps-Stokes Estates v. Nixon, 222 N. Y. 93, 118 N. E. 241 (1917).
18. Id. at 99, 118 N. E. at 243.
19. 237 App. Div. 700, 262 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st Dep't 1933).
20. 263 N. Y. 491, 189 N. E. 562 (1934).
21. See note 16, supra.
22. N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW (1909) § 50.
23. Hoffay v. Hershenstein, 232 App. Div. 149, 249 N. Y. Supp. 167 (1st Dep't 1931).
24. As against the bona fide purchaser for value before maturity, the law precludes an
inquiry into the consideration unless a real defense exists. It seems that this defense falls
squarely into the definition of a personal defense as set forth in NORTON'S BILS AND NOTES
(4th ed. 1914) 282: "Personal defenses, in contrast to this, [real defenses] are founded upon
the act, conduct, or agreement of the parties with reference to the instrument. The instrument with them has a legal inception, and, as an instrument, is a binding obligation. But,
as between immediate parties, the courts will not grant a remedy, because the plaintiff
in the action-the party seeking its enforcement in the suit-has violated some right, or
failed in some duty, so that he has no standing in court."
1. 48 STAT. 202, 40 U. S.

C. A. § 403 (a) (3) (1933).
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low cost houses, and slum clearance,2 as part of the public works program. On
appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer, held, one judge dissenting, that the
N. I. R. A., in so far as it attempts to authorize the national government to condemn
private property for low-cost housing and slum clearance projects, is unconstitutional,
since such a use is not a "public use." Judgment affirmed. United States V.
Certain Lands in City of Louisville, Jefferson County, Ky., 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A.
6th, 1935).
Although the federal government is one strictly of delegated powers, and although
there is no constitutional provision expressly authorizing the exercise of eminent
domain, it is nevertheless well settled that the federal government commands this
power. Whether it be regarded as derivative from the inherent attributes of
sovereignty,3 or from a grant by implication of the Fifth Amendment, 4 or from the
"necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution, fundamentally the power of
eminent doifiain stems from sovereign police power. Despite this underlying kinship
there is discernible an acknowledged, if sometimes shadowy, line of demarcation.8
The one is a regulation of the use of property, and as a consequence compensation
is not a condition of its exercise; the other is a taking of property, and is conditioned
upon compensation. The use of property may be regulated for the public welfare,
but beyond certain limits private property cannot be interfered with under the
guise of the police power, and recourse must be had to the power of eminent domain.7
2. 48 STAT. 201, 40 U. S. C. A. § 402 (d) (1933).
3. "The right is the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from
sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law." Kohl v. United States, 91
U. S. 367, 371 (1875Y; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883); Chappell v. United
States, 160 U. S. 499 (1896); NicnoLs, E -mrar DomAss
(2d ed. 1917) 58.
4. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875); see McKeon, Constiutional Limitatiort
Upon the Power of Eminent Domain (1933) 6 Rocx Mr. L. REv. 16; (1935) 33 MxCI.
L. REv. 957. On the other hand, from the premise that the power is one inherent in
sovereignty, it has been argued that the right of eminent domain is limited, not conferred, by the Constitution. See United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 518 (1883); 1
LEwis, Emmimm DomAw (3d ed. 1909) § 10.
5. U. S. CoxsT. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. "The Congress shall have power ... To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'
See also United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 681 (1896). "The right to condemn is not
expressly given in the Constitution. It results from the powers that are given, and it is
implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those powers."
6. Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 85 (1876).
"In their leading features, these
powers are plainly different, . . . the [police] power . . . is generally based upon
disaster, fault or inevitable necessity. . . . On the other hand, the power of eminent
domain ... for the most part is founded, not in calamity or fault, but in public utility!"
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U. S. 561, 592, 593 (1906). "Private
property cannot be taken without compensation for public use under a police regulation....
If the Government, Federal or State, finds it necessary to take private property for public
use, it must obey the constitutional injunction to make or secure just compensation to
the owner." See 1 Lwis, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6.
7. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U. S. 561 (1906); Lake View
v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191 (1873); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 13 Bush. 210
(Ky. 1877); Matter of Cheesbrough, 78 N. Y. 232 (1879); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
Canal Co., 66 Pa. 41 (1870); Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80 (1876); Coyne v. Memphis,
118 Tenn. 651, 102 S. W. 355 (1907); Askam v. King County, 9 Wash. 1, 36 Pac. 1097'
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The requirement that a taking by right of eminent domain shall be for a "public
use" s has created an issue sharply contested in the cases, as a result of which two
well defined theories are cognizable. The weight of authority limits a "public use"
to the strict definition of use by the public as of right.0 The Supreme Court,
however, has consistently concurred in the liberal view which defines a "public use"
as one beneficial directly or indirectly to the general welfare.10 At an early date
the rule was laid down that it was not essential that the entire community or even
any considerable portion thereof should directly enjoy the benefit of an improvement in order to constitute a "public use."" Some years later, in allowing a single
individual to condemn property for the purpose of irrigating his own land, the
Court held further, that what is a "public use" may depend upon the surrounding
facts.' 2 Twice thereafter, the Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, expressly
(1894) (legislation providing for swamp drainage, with no compensation for property taken
or damaged held not sustainable as an exercise of the police power) ; 1 Lswis, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 249.
8. The restriction to taking for "public use" is implied and not expressed aq such in tile
Fifth Amendment. Further, this section applies only to the federal government and is not
a limitation upon the power of the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U. S. 242 (1833) ;
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U. S. 84 (1857); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U. S. 166 (1871);
Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490 (1893).
It is claimed that the citizen is
deprived of his property without due process of law and in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it be taken by the state, whether through taxation or eminent domain, for
any other than a public use. It is in view of this contention that the Supreme Court
has frequently been called upon to determine the question of what is a "public use," in
cases where the state was the condemnor. Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
112 (1896).
9. Ferguson v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N. W. 604 (1926); Haley v.
Davenport, 132 Me. 148, 168 Atl. 102 (1933); Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247,
61 Atl. 413 (1905); Board of Health v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 49 N. W. 894 (1891);
Matter of Mayor, 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043 (1892); Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 At]. 904 (1913); Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash.
490, 74 Pac. 681 (1903); 2 CooixE, CoNsTiTuTioxAL LITATioN S (8th ed. 1927) 1131;
1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 257, 258; 1 NicoLs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128.
10. Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896); Clark v. Nash, 198
U. S. 361 (1905); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (1906); Mt.
Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30
(1916); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S.
233 (1920); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700 (1923). Lewis criticizes this
interpretation of "public use," and urges that the words mean the same as use by the public.
He assigns as another reason for adhering to the strict definition, the point that " . . . It is
the only view which gives the words any force as a limitation or renders them capable
of any definite and practical application." 1 Lwis, op. cit. supra note 4, § 258.
11. Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896) (statute authorizing condemnation and assessments for the purpose of irrigating certain particular lands in a district
held to involve I "public use").
12. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905). This case went beyond the Fallbrook case,
holding that a single individual had the right to condemn land so that water might be
conveyed in ditches across his neighbor's land for the purpose of irrigating his own land
alone. The Court qualified its decision by adding that it did not desire to be understood
as approving the taking of private property in all cases where the taking might promote
the public interest and tend to develop the natural resources of the state. It held,
however, that upon the facts and conditions of the case under review, the use was a
public one, though the taking of the right of way benefitted only one individual.
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repudiated use by the general public as a universal test,' 3 and in three later
decisions the Court upheld, as dedicated to a "public use," legislation looking
unquestionably to the general social welfare of a limited class of the citizenry.' 4 The
instant court distinguishes these decisions as to state measures on the ground
that what is a "public use" under one sovereign may not be a "public use" under
another, specifically, that while in the exercise of its police power a state may do
those things which benefit the welfare of its people, the federal government has no
such power within the states. When the federal government exerts powers conferred upon it by the Constitution no valid objection can be predicated merely upon
the fact that such exercise involves incidents generally attributed to police power.1"
But in previous decisions upholding the federal right of eminent domain, Congress'
authority to undertake the project for which the property was condemned was in
no way doubtful.16 The question now presented is whether the power of eminent
domain is circumscribed only by the limitation that it must be exercised for a public
use. Latent in the decision is the implication that granted the states may, within
the police power, undertake slum clearance and housing projects, the federal
government wields no parallel power,' 7 express or implied, which sanctions its
entry into this new area of socio-economic regulation.
13. "In discussing what constitutes a public use it [Clark v. Nash] recognized the
inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test." Strickley v. Highland Boy
Gold Aining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 531 (1906) (mining corporation was permitted to condemn
a right of way for an aerial bucket line to carry ores etc., down to the railway station.)
Ten years later justice Holmes wrote in even stronger terms, "The inadequacy of use by
the general public as a universal test is established." Mft. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck
Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30, 32 (1916). This doctrine was reaffirmed in Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700 (1923) (taking of land for highway
extension held for a "public use," even though the extension lay wholly within the
tract of a single land owner).
14. Mft. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240
U. S. 30 (1916) (power company allowed to condemn property for purpose of manufacturing, supplying, and selling to the public, power produced by the water from the condemned property); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917) (taxation for the
purpose of establishing a coal and fuel yard to sell at cost to the city inhabitants held for a
"public use"); Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920) (taxation providing for engaging
the state in manufacturing and marketing farm products, providing homes for the people,
and creating a state banking system, held for a "public use" and therefore, not a violation
of due process).
15. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 303
(1913); United States v. Hill, 243 U. S. 420 (1919); Hamilton, Collector v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919); United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S.
465 (1920); cf. Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
16. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875) (Act authorized Secretary of Treasury
to purchase in Cincinnati a site for a building for the accommodation of United States
courts. Subsequent Act made an appropriation for purchase at private sa-le or by
condemnation, conferring on him power to acquire the land by exercise of right of eminent
domain); United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883) (dam to improve the navigability of
a river); Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499 (195); (Act authorizing Secretary of
Treasury to acquire lands for a li hthouse by condemnation held constitutional); United
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896) (Memorial Park on battlefield);
Brown v- United States, 263 U. S. 78 (1923) (new town site to replace flooded land).
17. Unless it is assumed that the "general welfare clause" of the Constitution gives
Congress a blanket power to legislate for the general welfare, it would seem that authority
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CONTRACTS-PERSONAL SATISFACTION CLAUSE.-The plaintiff agreed to print stationery for the defendant's assignor at a price to l.e determined by the actual cost of labor
and materials plus an amount of overhead charges satisfactory to the contractee. The
defendant objected to the charges on the sole ground that they were unsatisfactory.
The trial court found that the determination of overhead was strictly a matter of
general business practice to which the "reasonable man" test could be applied, and
finding the charges reasonable, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal from
an order affirming the judgment, held, that the terms of the contract clearly indicated
that the parties intended the promisor to be the sole judge of his satisfaction. Judgment reversed. Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co. v. Western U. Tel. Co., 268
N. Y. 108, 196 N. E. 760 (1935).
Where a contract contains a provision that performance is to be satisfactory to
the promisor, it is uniformly held that this condition must be fulfilled by the promisee
before he can require performance of the promisor.1 However, the courts are far
from uniform in their interpretations of the apparent intent of the parties when
performance is conditioned upon the satisfaction of one of them. One line of authority,
actuated perhaps by a desire to prevent forfeitures, determines the kind of satisfaction
contracted for by the nature of the subject-matter of the contract. 2 Accordingly,
if the goods or services are of a type necessarily involving personal taste and judgment,
the promisor must be personally satisfied 3 If the element of personal taste is lacking,
the condition is deemed performed if a reasonable man would be satisfied. 4 In other
jurisdictions, if upon construction of the entire contract it clearly appears that the
parties intended performance to be to the satisfaction of the promisor,5 their intention

to employ eminent domain for housing projects must be found in connection with some
other constitutionally granted power. See Corwin, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Houlsing
(1935) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 131, wherein Professor Corwin expresses the view that the
legislation in question is sanctioned by the power granted in the "welfare clause" to
raise and spend money for the general welfare. See also Corwin, The Spendhig Power
of Congress (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 548; (1934) 34 COL. L. Rtv. 1359; Note (1935)
48 HARv. L. Rv. 806, 808; cf. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 279
N. Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (taking.of land by New York City Housing Authority
for slum clearance and housing project, held for public use for which condemnation
was authorized).
1. Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414 (C. C. E. D. Mich, 1888); McCarren v. McNulty, 73 Mass. 139 (1856); Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304,
136 N. W. 457 (1912); see S PAGE, CONTRACTS (1921) § 2617.
2. McCartney v. Badovinac, 62 Colo. 76, 160 Pac. 190 (1919) (employment contract
involving judgment); Union League v. Blymyer Ice Mach. Co., 204 111. 117, 68 N. M. 409
(1903) (refrigerating machine need not be only reasonably satisfactory); Miller v. Phillips,
39 R. I. 416, 98 At. 59 (1916) (contract to paint a house) ; see Nicholas, Validity of Defense
of Dissatisfaction (1889) 9 YALE L. J. 114.
3. Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N. W. 457 (1912) (employment
of agent); Schmand v. Janidorf, 175 Mich. 88, 140 N. W. 996 (1913) (employment of a
candy-maker); Magee v. Scott & Holston Lumber Co., 78 Minn. 11, 80 N. W. 781 (1899)
(employment contract); Gwynne v. Hitchner, 66 N. J. L. 97, 48 At]. 571 (1901) (employment of color mixer).
4. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 199 Mass. 220, 85 N. E. 446 (1908) (erection
of coal pocket) ; Fechteler v. Whittemore, 205 Mass. 6, 91 N. E. 155 (1910) (articles of
merchandise); Richison v. Mead, 11 S. D. 639, 80 N. W. 131 (1899) (contract to sink a well).
S. Barnett v. Beggs, 208 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) (architect's plans and specilcations); Koll v. Bush, 6 Colo. App. 294, 40 Pac. 579 (1895) (employment of chef); Zaleski
v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218 (1876); Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873) (suit of clothes);
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will be given effect, regardless of the nature of the subject-matter involved.0 On the
other hand, if it is impossible clearly to determine the parties' intention from the
contract, performance need only be to the satisfaction of the mythical reasonable
man.7 The precise approach employed by the New York courts in personal satisfaction cases is an open question.8 The doubt existing is indicated by the holding
of the lower courts in the instant case. Disregarding the explicit language of the
parties, they held that since the question of overhead charges could be determined
by resort to objective standards of business practice, the reasonable man test should
be employed. The Court of Appeals, however, deduced from the entire contract an
intention that the promisor be actually satisfied with the charges. In reaching this
conclusion the court relied upon the fact that the expert testimony in the case dearly
showed that the allocation of overhead charges in a particular business was incapable
of ascertainment by any objective tests. As a precedent for its decision the court
cited Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden.0 This case has usually been regarded as
indicating that New York applies only the test of the nature of the subject matter
to determine the extent of performance required by a personal satisfaction clause.
Whether the court therein applied the reasonable man test on the ground that the
successful operation of boilers was susceptible to objective determination, or upon
the ground that the parties merely contracted for a satisfactory job according to
objective standards is debatable.' 0 Several subsequent decisions seem to indicate
that the intention of the parties, as disclosed by the terms of the contract, will be given
controlling effect. 1 In the instant case, the absence of an objective standard for
measuring performance allows the result to be explained either upon the basis of the

subject-matter theory, or upon the ground of effecting the parties' intention.
Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 (1878) (picture); McClure v. Briggs, 58 VL 82, 2 At. 583
(1886) (organ).
6. Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1888) (printing
presses); McCormick Harvesting-Machine Co. v. Chesrown, 33 Minn. 32, 21 N. W. 846
(1884) (cord binder); Williams v. Hirshorn, 91 N. J. L. 419, 103 At. 23 (1918) (contract
to waterproof walls); Garland v. Keeler, 15 N. D. 548, 103 N. W. 484 (1906) (harvesting
machine); Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 291, 2 Ad. 230 (18S5) (elevator); Seeley v. Welles,
120 Pa. 69, 13 At. 736 (1888) (reaper and binder); Tatum v. Geist, 46 Wash. 226, 89 Pac.
546 (1907) (planing machine).
7. Bridgeford & Co. v. Meagher, 144 Ky. 479, 139 S. W. 750 (1911); Wentworth v.
_m,"r or
Manhattan Market Co., 218 Mass. 91, 106 N. E. 118 (1914); see also, RsrmT
TE LAw oP Coz.T=crs (1932) § 265.
8. In 1 W=ISTON, CoxN- crs (1920) § 44, it is claimed that as a matter of law, New
York imposes the duty onl' of satisfying a reasonable man, unle s the subject matter of
the contract involves personal taste. In HELir, CoNTRAcrs (2d ed. 1926) 455, 456, a similar
opinion is expressed, but it is there suggested that New York would give effect to the terms
of a contract not involving personal taste, provided the terms were clear and unqualified.
STAT=arET OF Co.,"crs (1933)
Contra: WnirxsmE, NEw YORY AronOATioNs To THE
456.
9. 101 N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749 (1886).
10. See note 8, supra. The three commentators cited therein cite the case of Duplex
Safety Boiler v. Garden as their authority.
11. Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 23 N. E. 406, 5 L. R. A. 554 (1889); Crawford v.
Mail & Express Pub. Co., 163 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. 616 (1900); Ginsberg v. Friedman, 144
App. Div. 779, 131 N. Y. Supp. 517 (1st Dep't 1926); Duffy v. Bing, 217 App. Div. 10,
215 N. Y. Supp. 755 (Ist Dep't, 1926).
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CRIMINAL LAw-ACCESSORIES-CONVICTION OF ACCESSORY FOR LESSER DEGREE O
HOMICIDE CHARGED.-The defendant was indicted as accessory before the fact to
the murder of her husband. The perpetrator of the crime confessed, was found
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant,
upon separate trial, was found guilty as accessory before the fact to manslaughter.
She applied to the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the
conviction of voluntary manslaughter, on an indictment as accessory before the fact
to murder, was illegal. The writ, ordering her discharge, was granted, and the sheriff
appealed this ruling. Held, one judge dissenting, that an indictment as accessory
before the fact to murder will sustain a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Moore
v. Lowe, 180 S. E. 1 (W. Va., 1935).
A West Virginia statute provides that every accessory before the fact is "punishable" as a principal in the first degree.' It had been held in a previous case that this
statute in effect abolished the common law distinction between principals and accessories. 2 On the basis of that decision, the court in the instant case held that
since a conviction of a lesser degree than that for which a principal has been
indicted will not be set aside where there is no prejudice to the defendant,8 the same
rule should apply to accessories.
It is universally held that statutes in derogation of the common law will be
strictly construed. Since "punish" means to impose a penalty for the commission
of a crime, 4 statutes similar to the West Virginia statuteu were held to be applicable
solely to the punishment of an accessory. That is, upon being found guilty of the
crime for which he has been 'indicted, the accessory is liable to the same punishment
as the principal would receive upon conviction for a similar crime. 0 In other
jurisdictions, where the distinction between principals and accessories has been
abolished by statute, the legislature's have plainly indicated their intent by providing
that the offender shall be indicted, tried and punished as a principal. 7 It is evident
that the court in the principal case has read into the statute a meaning not contemplated by the legislature. Inasmuch as there is no statutory authority in
the jurisdiction to uphold a verdict which had been arrived at by applying the
general rules governing the trial of principals to accessories, the defendant should
1. W. VA CODE (1931)

§ 61-11-6.

2. Well v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (1915). But see State v. Powers, 91 W.
Va. 737, 746, 113 S. E. 912, 916 (1922) (distinction between principals and accessories still
recognized).
3. State v. Young, 67 N. J. L. 223, 51 Ati. 939 (1902); People v. Schlelman, 197
N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910); see State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 143, 43 S. E. 230,
239 (1903); N. Y. PrNA LAW (1909) § 610; WHARTON, HoaUCImE (3d ed. 1907) § 653.
4. Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 36 S. E. 630 (1900); see Commonwealth v. Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36, 42 (1875).
5. ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 143, § 8; R. I. Gmr. LAWS (1923) § 6251; Wxs. STAr.
(1931) § 353.05.
6. If it was intended that accessories could be indicted as principals, there was no
need to provide the punishment, inasmuch as the penalty for principals was already set out.
State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (1848) ; State v. Shapiro, 29 R. I. 133, 69 AtI. 340 (1908)
(statute construed to mean that where an accessory before the fact was accused of a felony,
he was to be proceeded against as an accessory and punished as a principal); see Nichols
v. State, 35 Wis. 308, 311 (1874).
7. CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 971; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) e. 38, § 611;
KAY. REv. STAT. AN. (1923) § 21-105; N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 2; N. D. Com'. LAWS
ANN. (1913) § 9218; Omrio GEN. CODE AN. (Page, 1926) § 12380; WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN.
(Remington, 1932) § 2260; AccEssORIFS AND ABETrORS AcT, 24 & 25 Vicr. c. 94, § 1 (1861).
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have been entitled to her discharge on principle. The court in the instant case,
seeking to justify its stand on the conviction, remarks that the fact that juries,
actuated by compassion or otherwise, fail to do their whole duty, and return verdicts
of lesser degrees where the elements of higher degrees are present, is no reason why
the accused should go free. The court adds that it is necessary in the practical
administration of criminal law to uphold these verdicts so that persons guilty of
serious crimes will not go unpunished.8 It is submitted that this reasoning is not
based upon legal principle; that it is of social value is not denied, but, as such, it is
a matter for the legislature and not the courts.
An interesting question is presented in the case as to whether or not there can be
an accessory before the fact to manslaughter. At common law it was generally held
that there could not be, as voluntary manslaughter involves a killing in the heat of
sudden passion and without malice. It would thus be inconsistent with the idea of
premeditation which is embodied in the procuring or counseling necessary to constitute one an accessory.9 At common law it was necessary that the principal first be
convicted, and then the accessory was charged with being accessory to the identical
offense embraced by the conviction.' 0 Today the necessity for prior conviction has
been abolished by statutes in many jurisdictions." As a result, some jurisdictions
now hold that there can be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter. 12 They
proceed on the theory that as the accessory can be tried before the principal, his
offense is now an independent one, and may be treated as such. At common law
the crime for which the accessory was indicted was limited to that crime for which
the principal was convicted; 13 today the crime of the principal must be proved as
part of the prosecution's case against the accessory,1 4 but from that point on the
crime of the accessory is considered independently. Thus the offense of the accessory
is not necessarily of the same grade as that of the principal;25 the instigator may act
8. If the conviction of the lesser degree is not sustained, the offender may plead double
jeopardy to an attempt to try him again for the higher degree; the jury, by its verdict
of the lesser degree, has acquitted the defendant of the higher offense. See N. Y. P'AL
LAW (1909)

§ 32.

9. Bibithe's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 43b, 76 Eng. Reprints 991 (1597); 1 HA=E P. C. 437, 616;
State v. O'Shields, 163 S. C. 408, 161 S. E. 692 (1931); Bowman v. State, 20 S. W. 558
(Tex. Crim. App. 1892).
10. Bowen v. State, 25 Fla. 645, 6 So. 459 (1889) (where the principal was tried
separately and acquitted, it was held that judgment could not be entered against one
found guilty as an accessory) ; People v. Jordan, 244 Ill. 386, 91 N. E. 482 (1910) ; Baron
v. People, 1 Park. Cr. Cas. 246 (N. Y. 1851). Where there was a joint trial, and the
principal was acquitted, the accessory could not be found guilty as it would have bun
absurd to have had a guilty accessory and no principal. 4 Br Coimt.i 0 323.
11. CAL. PFm. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 971; IrL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 38, § 612;
A.E. R v. STAT. (1930) c. 143, § 8; MAss. A., N. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 274, § 3;
N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 2; W. VA. CODE (1931) § 61-11-7; CnnEAL LAW AcT, 7
Gno. IV, c. 64, § 9 (1826).
12. Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. 1 (1917); see State v. Hermann, 117 Mo.

629, 637, 23 S. W. 1071, 1073 (1893); cf. State v. Acay, 47 R. I. 292, 132 At. 436
(1926) (there may be an accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter).
13.

See note 10, supra.

14. State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (1848); People v. Gray, 25 Wend. 465 (N. Y. 1841);
Figaroa v. 5tate, 58 Tex. Crim. App. 611, 127 S. W. 193 (1910); Ogden v. State, 12
Wis. 532 (1860) ; see State v. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 87, 34 Pac. 410, 412 (1893).
15. Klein v. People, 31 N. Y. 229 (1865); 1 WmH o.v, CnR
.AL LAw (12th ed., 1932)
§ 276

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

in the heat of passion while the perpetrator may act deliberately; the instigator would
then be guilty of manslaughter, and the perpetrator of murder. However, in .the
jurisdictions which hold that there may be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter, the rulings have been based upon statutes which had completely abolished
the distinction between accessories and principals. Where the distinction still
exists in any degree, it is submitted that there can be no accessory before the fact to
manslaughter.
CRIMINAL LAw-HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTES-SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND PAR-

DON AS BASIS FOR INCREASED PENALTY.-The defendant was convicted of burglary
in the second degree. Sentence was imposed under the habitual criminal statute' on
the basis of three previous convictions. The defendant obtained a writ of habeas
corpus and at the hearing contended that the statute was inapplicable because he had
received a suspended sentence for one felony and had been pardoned for another.
Held, one justice dissenting, that the pardoned offense constituted a conviction, but
that the suspended sentence did not. People ex rel. Jobissy v. Murphy, 244 App. Div.
834, 279 N. Y. Supp. 762 (3d Dep't 1935).
Considerable legislation imposing a higher degree of punishment for successive
offenses, has recently been enacted throughout the country.2 These habitual criminal
statutes have been held constitutional since the subsequent offense commands the
greater penalty3 and is in no wise an additional punishment for the earlier transgressions. The purpose and justification of these statutes are two-fold: 4 (1) the
criminal does not so readily repeat a crime where a subsequent offense commands a

much greater penalty; (2) social utility demands permanent incarceration of those
who are unresponsive to reformatory treatment. In many of these statutes the term
"conviction" or "convicted" occurs without further explanation and the duty of
definition devolves upon the court. For some purposes a verdict or plea of guilty
standing alone has been held sufficient to spell out a conviction,5 but the true legal
meaning requires the presence of a judgment as well.0 Unless otherwise declared
by law the court has power to suspend sentence. 7 After a verdict or plea of guilty,
1. N. Y. PExAL LAW (1932) § 1942.
2. See statutes discussed in cases cited note 9, infra; ELLIOT, CoNmcTno TnIEoRIEs IN
STATUTORY CmmnNAL LAW (1931) 186-200.

3. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311 (1901); State v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626 (S. D.
Iowa 1904); Smith v. State, 62 Fla. 91, 57 So. 348 (1912); State v. Dowden, 137 Iowa
573, 115 N. W. 211 (1908); Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579, 16
L. R. A. 256 (1891); Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648 (1893);
In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 68 N. W. 990, 34 L. R. A. 256 (1891); People v. Gowasky,
244 N. Y. 451, 155 N. E. 737 (1927); Ex parte Allen, 91 Ohio St. 315, 110 N. E. 535 (1915);
see (1927) 11 MNxn. L. Rrv. 561, 561-562.
4. See (1931) 21 J. Calm. L. 612, 614-615; (1929) 73 SoL. J. 305-306; ELMOT, op. eit.
supra note 2, at 186-187.
5. Cases cited note 9, infra; see State v. Will, 103 Kan. 59, 60, 172 Pac. 1003, 1003 (1918);
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 365, 73 Ad. 427, 428 (1909); Comment (1930)
30 COL. L. REv. 1045.

6: Cases cited notes 9, 11-13, infra; see Schooley v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 767, 769
(C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Judge v. Powers, 156 Iowa 251, 257, 136 N. W. 315, 316-317 (1912);

Commonwealth v. Minnich, 250 Pa. 363, 367, 95 Atl. 565, 566 (1915); Comment (1930)
30 COL. L. REv. 1045.
7. Huggins v. Caldwell, 223 Ky. 468, 3 S. W. (2d) 1101 (1928); Gehrmann v. Osborne,
79 N. J. Eq. 430, 82 Atl. 424 (Ch. 1912); People v. Webster, 14 Misc. 617, 36 N. Y. Supp.
745 (Sup. Ct. 1895). Contra: Ex parte Fisher, 95 W. Va. 397, 121 S. E. 287 (1924).
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it may postpone the pronouncement of judgment, or when judgment has already
been rendered, the court may suspend execution thereof, 8 that is, withhold the performance of sentence. A suspension of execution does not erase a conviction within
the strict construction of the term, but the jurisdictions are in conflict as to whether
The courts
a suspended sentence is a conviction under habitual criminal statutes
have always accorded the accused the benefit of every doubt, and consequently have
strictly construed penal statutes.' 0 On the basis of this principle, a suspended sentence, since not within the strict definition of a conviction should not constitute a
conviction under habitual criminal laws. In somewhat analogous situations, where
privilege or right would be affected by a previous conviction, a suspended sentence
will not constitute such a conviction. A suspended sentence will not disqualify a
witness" or a voter,1 2 nor invalidate a liquor license,' 3 nor is it sufficient ground for
the removal of an incumbent from office 14 or the revocation of a license for the
practice of medicine. 15 However, this interpretation is not in accord with the spirit
of habitual criminal laws. Inasmuch as it is the previous guilt of the prisoner that
enhances the criminality of the subsequent offense,1 the fact that no judgment has
been passed on his first offense does not mitigate this culpability and should not
.affect the consideration of the subsequent misdeed. It is the previous delinquency,
and not the formal 'conviction, that augments the criminality of successive offenses.
Decisions are in conflict as to whether a pardoned crime may be considered a previous conviction under an habitual criminal statute.17 In other situations, where
8. Huggins v. Caldwell, 223 Ky. 468, 3 S. W. (2d) 1101 (1928) ; Weber v. State, 58 Ohio
St. 616, 51 N. E. 116 (1898). But cf. Woodcock v. Richey, 225 Ky. 318, 8 S. W. (2d)
389 (1928).
9. People v. Adams, 95 Mich. 541, 55 N. W. 461 (1893) (plea of guilty followed by
-void judgment is a conviction); People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 209 N. W. 110 (1926)
(judgment not rendered because of appeal is a conviction); Calloway v. State, 91 Tem.
-Cr. App. 504, 240 S. W. 554 (1922); Hall v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. App. 312, 243 S. W. 982
(1922) (suspended sentence is conviction). Contra: Ex pxne Rosencrantz, 211 Cal. 749,
297 Pac. 15 (1931) (suspended sentence not a conviction under fourth offender statute).
In this case the court reasoned that since a felony was defined as including sentence in a
state prison there could be no conviction of a felony since there was no such Eentence.
Singer v. United States, 278 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); Williams v. State, 125 Mir--. 347,
87 So. 672 (1921) (verdict without proof of judgment not a conviction).
10. McKay v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 826, 120 S. E. 138 (1923). See State v. Olson,
200 Iowa 660, 666, 204 N. W. 278, 280 (1925).
11. Bishop v. State, 41 Fla. 522, 26 So. 703 (1899); Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349, 20
N. W. 289 (1884); Blaufas v. People, 69 N. Y. 107 (1877); Sorrel v. State, 74 Tex. Cr.
App. 505, 169 S. W. 299 (1914). But see People v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 Pac. 372 (1920).
12. People v. Fabian, 192 N. Y. 443, 85 N. E. 672 (1908).
13.

Commonwealth v. Kiley, 150 Mass. 325, 23 N. E. 55 (1889).

14. State ex rel. Wilson v. Baird, 36 Ariz. 531, 288 Pac. 1 .(1930); Smith v. Common-wealth, 134 Va. 589, 113 S. E. 707 (1922); cf. In re Riccardi, 182 Cal. 675, 189 Pac. 694
(1920) (suspended sentence will not sustain disbarment proceedings).
15. State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 79 S. W. (2d) 83 (Ark. 1935).
16. Graham v. State, 224 U. S. 616 (1912); Carlesi v. People, 233 U. S. 51 (1914),
,aGfg sub. no., People v. Carlesi, 203 N. Y. 547, 101 N. E. 1114 (1913); Kelly v. People,
115 1l. 583, 4 N. E. 644 (1886); see (1930) 14 M=1nnr. L. REv. 293, 294.
17. The following cases hold that a pardon wipes out a previous conviction under a
second offender statute: State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219 (1931); State v. Martin,
59 Ohio St. 212, 52 N. E. 188 (1898); Sanders v. State, 108 Tex. Cr. App. 467, 1 S. W.
(2d) 901 (1928); Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. App. 194, 20 S. W. (2d) 416 (1928).
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disqualifications and disabilities follow a conviction, the courts have accorded different effects to a pardon depending upon the right or privilege involved. For
example a pardon will restore to competency a witness1 8 or a voter,1 9 but on the
other hand, a crime, though pardoned, will constitute adequate grounds for the
removal of a public officer. 20 There have been many attempts to explain this differentiation of rights 21 but none is satisfactory. When called upon to determine
whether a pardoned crime constitutes a ground for disbarment proceedings the jurisdictions have clashed. The majority, holding in the affirmative, 22 reasons that where
there is a pardon there is an admission of guilt and the pardon does not wipe out this
guilt; the minority contends that the pardon will obliterate both the conviction and
the guilt.2a The former argument is the more applicable to the habitual criminal
cases, since, as previously asserted, it is not the conviction but the fact of former
guilt that enhances the criminality of the subsequent offense.
The New York courts have held that both a suspended sentence24 and a pardon 28
are previous convictions under the second offender statute. 20 It is to be observed
that the second offender statute expressly defines a conviction as inclusive of a suspended sentence, 27 but as to the fourth offender statute the courts, in the absence
of express statutory provision, have held that a conviction does not comprehend
a suspended sentence. 28 The result is that with respect to a second or third offense,
Contra: Herndon v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 197, 48 S. W. 989 (1899)

(statute sets

mandatory life sentence for a third offense) ; State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221, 262 Pac. 622
(1927) (second offender statute) ; see (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 561.

18. Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 450 (1892); Logan v. United States, 144 U. S.
263 (1892) ; Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (1896) ; cf. Blakely v. Bearden, 139

Okla. 237, 281 Pac. 952 (1929) (statute makes pardon ineffective as to witnesses in certain
cases).
19.

Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 19 S. W. 407 (1892); Puryear v. Commonwealth,

83 Va. 51, 1 S. E. 512 (1887); see State ex rel. Collins v. Lewis, 111 La. 693, 35 So. 816
(1904) (a pardon will restore a person to competency as a juror). But a crime although
pardoned will form adequate basis for the refusal of a driving license. Bald! v. Gilehrist,
204 App. Div. 425, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1st Dep't 1923).
20. State v. Irby, 81 S. W. (2d) 419 (Ark. 1935); State ex rel. Webb v. Parks, 122
Tenn. 230, 122 S. W. 977 (1909).
21. See Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 HIAv. L. Rv. 647, 653.

22.

Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337 (1908); In the Matter of
, an Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 (1881).

23. Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. 333 (1886) ; Ex parte Crisler, 159 Miss. 247, 132 So. 103
(1931); Scott v. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343, 25 S. W. 337 (1894).

24. People ex rel. Cohen v. Rattigan, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1003 (Co. Ct. 1915), afl'd, 172
App. Div. 957, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1140 (1st Dep't 1916).
25. Carlesi v. People, 233 U. S. 51 (1914), aff'g sub. nom., People v. Carlesi, 208 N. Y.
547, 101 N. E. 1114 (1913); People v. Van Zile, 80 Misc. 329, 141 N. Y. Supp. 168 (Sup.

Ct. 1913); People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1917); People
ex rel. Malstrom v. Kaiser, 135 Misc. 67, 236 N. Y. Supp. 619 (Sup. Ct. 1929), ag'd, 228
App. Div. 743 (3d Dep't 1930).
26.
27.
28.

N. Y. PasAr LAW (1926) § 1941.
N. Y. CoDE OF CaIM. Paoc. § 470 (b).
People ex rel. Marcley v. Lawes, 254 N. Y. 249, 172 N. E. 487 (1930); People v.

Schaller, 224 App. Div. 3, 229 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1st Dep't 1928); People ex rel. Robideau
v. Kaiser, 134 Misc. 486, 235 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Sup. Ct. 1929); People ex. rel. Friedman
v. Kaiser, 134 Misc. 786, 236 N. Y. Supp. 432 (Sup. Ct. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 231
App. Div. 786, 246 N. Y. Supp. 914 (3d Dep't 1930) ; see (1931) 21 J. Camm. L. 612, 614.
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a suspended sentence is a conviction, but under the mandatory life sentence provision
of the Baumes Law the suspended sentence is not a conviction. This construction of
the term has been held to be inconsistent, and not in accord with the intent of the
legislators, 29 and is probably the result of a judicial desire to mitigate the harshness
of what has been characterized as an oppressive statute.2 0
The court in the present case, in holding that a suspended sentence does not
constitute a previous conviction merely followed the New York authority. However,
in holding that a pardoned crime is within the scope of "conviction" under the Baumes
Law the court manifested an evident intent not to extend further the realm of
technical exceptions.

DA.IAGES-NEGLIGENCE-RECO-VERY

YoR

PHYsIcAL

CONSEQUENCES

Or

FRIGHT

WITHOUT Ia.PAcr.-A truck was negligently parked on a hill by the defendant and

as a consequence it rolled backward.

After careening off the side of a street car it

finally came to rest on the embankment fronting the plaintiff's property.

She,

while seated at the window of her home, saw the onrushing truck and feared for the
safety both of herself and her child who was ascending the steps leading to the
house. As a consequence of the fright the plaintiff suffered a miscarriage and other
physical injuries for which suit was brought and judgment recovered. On appeal, held,
one judge dissenting, that an immediate and unavoidable physical invasion of personal
security, though unaccompanied by impact, gives a right of action for the physical
consequences of fright. Judgment affirmed. Frazee et ux. v. Western Dairy Products,
47 P. (2d) 1037 (Wash. 1935).

The instant case lends credence to the view that the weight of authority no longer
subscribes to the impact rule.' For many years the majority
favored the proposition that there could be no recovery for
quences of fright in the absence of immediate physical injury. 2
doctrine has been overruled in England and often repudiated in

of jurisdictions had
the physical conseThis much criticized
this country. 4 Even

29. See dissent by Cardozo, J., in People ex rel. Marcley v. Law.es, 254 N. Y. 249, 252,
172 N. E. 487, 488 (1930) contending that § 470 (b) was intended to apply also to the
Baumes Law; see Comment (1930) 30 COL. L. Rzv. 1045, 1048-49.
30. See Comment (1930) 30 CoL. L. Rlv. 1045, 1049; (1930) 78 U. or P.

L. Rzv. 561,

562; (1931) 21 J. Car. L. 612, 613-614.
1. AIcCon
cx, DAmAGEs (1935) 321; Bohlen and Poilkoff, Liability in New Yorh for
the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbances (1932) 32 CoL.. L. Riv. 409, n. 2.

2. St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226 (1901); Cleveland Ry. Co. v.
Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 917 (1900); McGee v. Vanover, 14S RKy. 737, 147
S. W. 742 (1912); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 16S Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897);
Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W. 335 (1S99); Ward v. West Jersey Rd. Co.,
65 N. 3. L. 383, 47 At. 561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 4S
N. E. 354 (1896); Ewing v. Pittsburg Ry. Co. 147 Pa. 40, 23 At. 340 (1892); Victorian
Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888) (overruled, see note 3, infra).
3. Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 K. B. 669; Hambrook v. Stokes [1925] 1 K. B.
141 (recovery for injuries resulting from fear for another).
4. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Kimber, 212 Ala. 102, 101 So. 827 (1924); Lindley v.
Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Clemm v. Atchison, Topekm, etc., Ry. Co.,
126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928) ; Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182 (1933);
Purcell v. St. Paul City R. R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892); Cashln v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. (2d) 862 (1934); Hanford v. Omaha Ry. Co.,
113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 643 (1925); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R. L 186, 66 At.
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in jurisdictions which have adopted it the slightest impact, causing or accompanying
the fright will found an action. 5 The most forceful argument advanced by the
proponents of the impact rule is that public policy dictates a denial of recovery
in situations so amenable to spurious claims.6 This contention is weak when, in
point of time, the injury is directly consequent upon the fright. In such a case
courts committed to the impact rule sometimes show leniency.7 The contention
assumes more formidable proportions in instances where an appreciable length of time
has elapsed between the alleged fright and injury, for here, undoubtedly, an invitation
is extended to recover for injuries resulting from purely extraneous causes.8 In
counterbalance is the consideration that just, provable claims should not be defeated
because spurious ones may be asserted. Justice would seem to require either a
qualification of the impact rule by the admission of well recognized exceptions,0 or its
displacement by a provision for clear and convincing proof of causality. In committing itself to a more liberal view than precedent required' 0 the court, in the
principal case, rejected any distinction between injuries immediate and remote in
point of time, thereby serving notice that in the absence of the arbitrary impact rule
the usual principles of negligence apply. Since it was the defendant who appealed the
higher court was not called upon to consider the interesting question raised by the
trial court's charge that there could be no recovery for injuries consequent upon
fear for the safety of another. The weight of American authority would seem to
be in accord.'" The trend away from the impact rule accentuates the necessity for
some agreement as to fundamental negligence concepts; for emotional disturbance
cases push these principles to the limit. Is the existence of a duty determined by
202 (1907); Colsher v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 117 (Tenn. 1935);
Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N. W. 392 (1928).
5. Homans v. Boston Elevated Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902); Porter v.
Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 At]. 860 (1906); Comstock v. Wilson,
257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
6. Two other arguments adduced in support of the rule are: (1) that damages are not
recoverable for negligent acts causing mere fright, and therefore the physical consequences
of fright are not actionable; (2) that the resultant injuries are not proximately caused by
the act. The former is clearly a non sequitur for an immediate consequent injury
eliminates the speculation that prevents recovery for fright alone. The latter fails because
the human experience that cautions the prudent man to break bad news softly testifies to
illness caused by emotional disturbances. See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury
Resulting from Negligence Without Impact (1902) 41 Am. L REo. (. s.) 141.
7. Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238, 105 N. E. 975 (1914), L. R. A. 1915D
830; Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914).
8. E.g., a miscarriage, in which instance a fall or any one of many other causes, either
unknown to the plaintiff or peculiarly within her knowledge might well have caused the
injury in question. Cf. Jones v. Pierce, 162 So. 214 (La. 1935).
9. See Bohlen and Polikoff, loc. cit. supra note 1, at 418.
10. O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 Pac. 550 (1916).
11. Damages cannot be recovered for the physical consequences of fear for the
safety of another. Southern Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S. E. 28 (1916);
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 9i7 (1900);
Fleming v. Lobel, 59 AtI. 28 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1904); Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec. Power
Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S. W. 775 (1927); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W.
497 (1935); cf. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Ati. 182 (1933). Contra: Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162
App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914); Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1
K. B. 141.
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forseeability of injury to the plaintiff individually or as a member of a class, or
probability of harm to anyone? Is it an unbroken chain of natural causality, or is it
probable result which fixes the proximate cause? 12 Such questions must be settled if
negligence cases, and especially "fright" cases, are to be intelligently rationalized and
juries properly instructed. A difference in emphasis
on the determinants of duty
13
may well affect the absence or presence of liability.
Human action would be inhibited and proof rendered speculative and uncertain if
any action would lie for mere fright unintentionally caused. Such damage falls
within the maxim de minimis non curat lex. However, an apparent injury raises the
question of a duty owing. Where forseeability of harm to the plaintiff is not a
determinant,14 the solution is relatively simple though the field of liability is
considerably enlarged. But when, as in the principal case, the orbit of duty is
defined by forseeability of harm to the plaintiff,15 though the particular injury was
not itself forseeable,' 6 a desirable limitation of liability is gained although at the
expense of certainty. An application of the latter principle discloses the possibility
of an actionable injury caused by fear for another.'1 Knowledge of circumstances

rendering a particular person susceptible to injury through emotional disturbance
clearly posits a duty not to cause excitement and renders the actor liable though the
injury is in fact caused by fear for another.i s
The trend away from the impact rule and the application, in emotional disturbance
cases, of traditional negligence principles throws into bold relief their confused
concepts. There is need for agreement as to fundamental concepts, and the requirement of clear and convincing proof in fright cases, unless the "hunch" of the judge
and the guess of the jury is to be decisive. 19
EQuITY-JURisicTioN-AMuLTiPLicrry oF STrrs.-The defendant corporation
commenced an action against its subsidiary to procure a judgment of dissolution
preliminary to the institution of an action of ejectment against the plaintiff by a
receiver. The plaintiff brought this action in equity to prevent the defendant from
12. For conflicting views of duty compare: "The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to
others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339,
344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). "Harm to someone being the natural result of the act, not only
that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain." Dissenting opinion, Palsgraf
v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 350, 162 N. E. 99, 103 (1928).
For conflicting
views as regards legal cause see BuRDIcx, TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 32. ,As to the application
of forseeability, see Edgar, Forseeabilityand Recovery in Tort (1934) 9 ST. Jormi's L. Pm,. 84.
13. Compare the majority opinion and the dissent in Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K. B.
141. The former treats the facts from the standpoint of proximate cause, the latter
considers the question to revolve about duty. Note the application of foreeablity in
each opinion.
14. See dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 347, 162
N. E. 99, 101 (1928).
15. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
16. Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mlass. 251 (1875); Polemis v. Furness Withy & Co. Ltd., [1921]
3 K. B. 560; see REsTATEEYT, TORTS (1934) §§ 435, 436 (2).
17. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933) (father whose physical
security had been invaded feared for the safety of his sons more perilously situated and
thereby suffered injury).
18. Alabama, F. & I. Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Hill v.
Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890).
19. See Kennedy, Prindplesor Facts? (1935) 4 FoAm
L. REv. 53.
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further prosecuting the dissolution action, and to enjoin it from prosecuting any
action wherein it should be asserted that its subsidiary had any right in certain
premises which had been the subject of a previous unsuccessful ejectment action by
the subsidiary against the plaintiff. The plaintiff urged that an injunction was
necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Held, that the prevention of a multiplicity
of suits is not an independent source of equitable jurisdiction. Judgment of
dismissal affirmed. Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 268 N. Y.
382, 197 N. E. 321 (1935).
That the prevention of a multiplicity of suits at law is a source of equitable
jurisdiction, like many another generalization, is not an infallible formula. Subject as
it is to limitations restricting its proper application, the maxim may be regarded as
axiomatic only to the extent to which it is qualified by judicial interpretation. The
courts are by no means in agreement as to the circumstances under which equity
will assume jurisdiction to enjoin in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits at law.
Irreconcilable constructions and inept terminology render vain any attempt to harmonize differences. The instances in which the problem may arise may be briefly classified
as those in which there is a controversy between many persons on the one hand and
an individual on the other, and those in which a number of suits between one
individual and another are involved. 1 By far the greater conflict is in the search
for the proper rule to apply to cases falling within the first category.2 In that class,
the object to be attained by resort to a court of equity for a bill of peace enjoining
litigation at law is to adjudicate in a single proceeding the particular right in dispute
among all the parties concerned, rather than have the matter controverted in
numerous suits instituted by each of the many parties in interest. It is urged, on the
one hand, that it is necessary only that there be a common question of law or
fact involved,3 while a more rigid view contends that this alone is not sufficient, but
that there must be some recognized ground of equitable interference, or a common
right or title involved, or some community of interest in the subject matter of the
controversy in order to warrant a joinder in one suit. 4 The United States Supreme
1. In 1 Poi'zRoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 245 the possible situations
which may give rise to a multiplicity of suits have been classified as follows: 1. Where the
same injured party, in order to obtain complete relief, is obliged to bring a number of
actions against the same wrongdoer, all growing out of the same wrongful act and
involving similar questions of fact and of law, e.g., nuisance, waste, continued trespass.
2. Where the dispute is between two individuals, one of whom institutes or is about to
institute a number of actions against the other, all depending upon the same legal
questions and similar issues of fact, e.g., repeated actions of ejectment to recover the same
tract of land. 3. Where several persons have individual claims against one party, all arising
from a common cause and governed by the same legal principles and involving similar
facts, e.g., illegal assessment or tax upon separate owners of distinct parcels of land.
4. Where one person claims a common iight against many persons, the enforcement of
which regularly would require a separate action brought by him against each of these
persons.
2. The dilemma in which the courts find themselves is in large measure attributable to
the treatment given the subject in 1 PoMERoY, EQuiTY
nJUaISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 269.
See also Fletcher, The Jurisdiction of Equity Relating to Multiplicity of Suits (1915) 24
YALE L. J. 642; Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties (1932) 45 Ixv. L. Rav.
1297; Comment (1932) 16 MiNn. L. REv. 679.
3. See Po izoy, op. cit supra note 1, § 269; cf. Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282,
26 Eng. Reprints 180 (Ch. 1737); Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L. R. 2 Ch. App.
8 (1866).
4. Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A.

4th,

1931);

Southern Steel
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Court has refused to ally itself with either group. It has adopted the view that
each case must rest upon its particular merits, that jurisdiction should be assumed
or denied with the end of rendering complete justice, upon a consideration of the
convenience to the parties, the adequacy of the legal remedy, and the results which
would follow.5 This position is commended by its flexibility. Situations in which
relief by bills of peace is sought are diverse,0 but underlying any assumption of
jurisdiction is the inclination of equity to discourage a multiplicity of suits at law.7
In controversies between two individuals, it is also said that multiplicity alone is
not an independent source of equitable interference, at least not in such a sense that
it will create a cause of action where none otherwise exists. 8 Other legal or
equitable rights, it is held, must exist before equity will enjoin the prosecution of
numerous actions at law growing out of the same transaction.0 In such cases,
where no defense can be asserted, the defendant ordinarily is not entitled to relief
in equity. 10 Nor is the mere fact that a large number of suits may be brought
Co. v. Hopkins, 174 Ala. 465, 57 So. 11 (1911); Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 70 Mi..
182, 12 So. 32 (1892).
5. Hale v. Allinson, 18S U. S. 56 (1903). This rule has been applied by the inferior
federal courts in a number of cases, typical of which is Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. 257
(C. C. A. Sth, 1904) and it has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bitterman v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 207 U. S. 205 (1907).
6. Equity will ordinarily assume jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of a tax where
the question involved is the validity of the whole tax on the entire property in the tax
district. Carlton v. Newman, 77 Me. 408, 1 At. 194 (1835); Holmes v. Baker, 82 Mass.
259 (1860); Fairley v. City of Duluth, 150 Minn. 374, 185 N. W. 390 (1921). But a
court of equity will not interfere by injunction to stay the collection of an illegal tax
on the application of a single ta-xpayer on the mere ground that it is illegally asz zed
as against his individual property. Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U. S. 10S (1870); Sherman
v. Leonard, 10 R. I. 469 (1873).
Where separate insurers, subject to legal action for a single loss, seek a bill of peace,
equity will ordinarily refuse to assume jurisdiction. Scottish Union etc., Ins. Co. of
Edinburgh v. Mohlman Co., 73 Fed. 66 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1896); Mechanics Ins. Co.
of Phila. v. Hoover Distilling Co., 173 Fed. 888 (C. C. A. Sth. 1909).
Again, where the bill was sought by a party against whom many claimants alleged a
single wrong, jurisdiction was denied in Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F. (2d) 66
(C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 174 Ala. 465, 57 So. 11 (1911);
Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1892). In Hale V. Allinson. IS
U. S. 56 (1903), jurisdiction was denied where the receiver of an insolvent corparation
asked for a bill of peace in order to enforce the double liability of stockholders in one suit.
But cf. Bailey v. Tillinghast, 99 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 6th, 1g00); Wyman v. Bowman,
127 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) where jurisdiction was asumed, the controllin; is-cues
apparently being common to all the defendant stockholders. In Miller v. Willett, 71 N. J.
Eq. 741, 65 AUt. 981 (1907) equity refused to intervene, each of the complainants having
a separate claim against the several defendants.
7. In New York the necessity for the remedy of a bill of peace has been to a large
extent obviated by N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1926) §§ 209, 211-213 providing for joinder of
parties by motion; id. (1935) § 258 providing for joinder of actions by motion.
8. Turner v. City of Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So. 132 (1902); Squires v. Nev Amzterdam
Casualty Co., 187 Ark. 467, 60 S. W. (2d) 135 (1933) ; see Purdy v. Manhattan El. Ry. Co,
13 N. Y. Supp. 295 (C. P. Gen. T. 1891).
9. Squires v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 187 Ark. 467, 60 S. W. (2d) 185 (1933);
Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226 (1892); see Po'.tno , op. dl.
supra note 1, § 250.
10. Jones v. Harris, 90 Ark. 51, 117 S. W. 1077 (1909); Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R.
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sufficient to give equity jurisdiction."
Otherwise stated, multitude alone does
not make multiplicity. Inadequacy of the remedy at law is, of course, the
fundamental principle. 12 Continuous or constantly repeated injuries to the plaintiff
may require the bringing of successive actions at law. That remedy may not be
adequate. If inadequate, it will be protected by injunction. 18 Broadly stated, it
may be said that equity ordinarily will not assume jurisdiction because a prior
adjudication may be used as a bar to all subsequent actions between the two parties
arising out of the same subject matter. Where, however, needless litigation is
persisted in by one party to an extent that is vexatious, the remedy at law is not
14
adequate because not as efficient to the ends of justice as the remedy in equity.
Public policy requires that an end be put to litigation, more especially, to fruitless
litigation. To perpetually litigate the same matter between the same parties would
be to render remedial justice a mockery. Consequently, purely vexatious litigation is
suppressed.' 5 In the principal case the court properly declined to assume jurisdiction
since no element of vexatiousness, waste or friction was present. To a subsequent
ejectment action, the plaintiff could conceivably plead res adjudicata.10 That plea
failing, the parties should not be precluded from litigating the merits of their controversy in a court of law. The remedy at law thus being ample, the cause was not
one for equitable cognizance.

EXECUTION SALE-Vom BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE LEVY-APPLICATION

OF

Caveat

Emptor.-The plaintiff purchased land at a sheriff's sale under execution, and paid
the purchase price to the sheriff. Subsequently the levy was held excessive1 by the
court and the sale declared void. The purchaser was joined as party defendant to the
action to set aside the sale and to cancel the sheriff's deed. An action was brought
Co., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226 (1892). Where there is a defense cognizable at law, there
is no occasion for equitable interference. Gray Co. Inc. v. Alemite Corp., 174 AtI, 136
(Del. Ch. 1934).
11. People ex rel Shephardson v. Universal Chiropractors Ass'n, 302 Ill. 228, 134
N. E. 4 (1922); Johnson v. Swanke, 128 Wis. 68, 107 N. W. 481 (1906) sembic; see
Frischer & Co., Inc. v. Elting, 60 F. (2d) 711, 715 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 287
U. S. 649 (1932).

12. Poyer v. Village of Desplaines, 123 Ill. 111, 13 N. E. 819 (1887) semble; Abel v.
Flesher, 296 I1. 604, 130 N. E. 353 (1921); Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E.
1068 (1909).
13. Cragg v. Levinson, 238 Il. 69, 87 N. E. 121 (1908); Wheelock v. Noonan, 108

N. Y. 179, 15 N. E. 67 (1888) ; see Williams v. New York Cent. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97, 111
(1857); WALSH, EQU

(1930) § 30.

14. Benedict v. Hall Mfg. Co., 211 Iowa 1312, 236 N. W. 92 (1931); Featherstone v.
Carr, 132 N. C. 800, 44 S. E. 592 (1903).

15. In Mendel v. Berwyn Estates, 109 N. J. Eq. 11, 15, 156 AtI. 324, 326 (Ch. 1931)
the court said: "To continue a course of litigious and contentious conduct by the
institution of additional actions is not only grossly oppressive to the adversary, but
an imposition on the court. It is an exhibition of contumacy meriting severe censure and
further persistence in this line of conduct will very likely result in severe punishment for
contempt."
16. In an action of ejectment subsequently instituted by the receiver of defendant's
subsidiary against Jhe present plaintiff, the court did, in fact, uphold the plea of res
adjudicata. MacAfter v. Boston & Maine R., 268 N. Y. 400, 197 N. E. 328 (1935).
1. See note 17, infra.

19361

RECENT DECISIONS

by the purchaser to recover the purchase money from the sheriff who had paid it
over to the judgment creditor. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff. On appeal
from a judgment denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, held, one judge
dissenting, that although the sale had been declared void, a purchaser at a sheriff's
sale was bound by the doctrine of caveat emptor in the absence of actual fraud or
misrepresentation by the sheriff. Brady v. Smothermann, 180 S. E. 862 (Ga.
App. 1935).

It is conceded that a purchaser at a judicial2 or execution sale is rigorously bound
by the doctrine of caveat enptor.3 It should be borne in mind that the original
purpose of this doctrine was to preclude an implication of a warranty of title by the
sheriff or the judgment-debtor in distinction to the rule of implied warranties in
ordinary sales 4 Considering that the proceeding is compulsory against the owner,
the defendant in execution, and that the sheriff is a mere ministerial agent of the
court, it could hardly be expected that such parties would issue any sort of warranty
or inducements to bid at the sale. Whatever the original purpose may have been,
the doctrine of caveat emptor has been widely extended in connection with judicial
sales, so that today the purchaser is presumed to take notice of the title for which
he bids, and in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation,5 neither a court of law
nor equity can relieve the purchaser even if there is a complete failure of title,
provided the sale is valid.6 A contrary view holds that the purchaser may, if title
fails, recover in equity, have a lien on the land, or maintain an action for money
had and received. 7 It was once thought that the doctrine of market overt applied
2. There are differences between an execution sale and a judicial sale. In an execution
sale, a proceeding in personam, the sheriff is the vendor, conducting the sale in pursuance
to the directions of a statute. The sale is based on general judgment for so much money
and is complete when the property is sold, whereas in a judicial sale, a proceeding in rem,
the court, being the vendor, must approve of the sale, based on an order to sell spe ific
property, and the sale is made by an agent of the court pursuant to its direction. Knm,
VoiD Jutciw ANsD ExacuTior SArxs (1899) §§ 15-18; cf. Castrique v. Imrie, L. R. 4
H. L. 414 (1870). However, this distinction is seldom stressed, a judicial sale being
considered as including an execution sale. Danner v. Murnan, 43 S. D. 289, 178 N. W.
987 (1920).
3. Hunn v. Lewis, 25 F. (2d) 271 (C.C. A. 8th, 1928); Bradley v. Forb3, 156 So.
716 (Fla. 1934); Wright v. Tichenor, 104 Ind. 185, 3 N. E. 853 (188S); Hamlln v.
Hawkins, 61 S.W. (2d) 348 (Mo. 1933); Stafford v. Williams, 12 Barb. 240 (N. Y. 1851);
Dickinson v. McCartney, 226 Pa. 552, 75 Atl. 735 (1910).
4.

See Umxn'oa

SALEs Acr § 13.

5. Homer v. Continental & Comm'l Bank, 198 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912); Sanders v.
Hamilton, 33 Ky. 550 (1835) (plaintiff in execution caused the property of a stranger
to be sold and was held responsible to the purchaser); Sullivan v. Wright, 201 Ky. 22,
255 S. W. 848 (1923) (auctioneer's misrepresentation prevented application of caveat
emptor); Preston v. Fryer, 38 Md. 221 (1873); Schwinger v. Hickok, 53 N. Y. 280 (1873)
(mortgagor knew purchaser could acquire no title since court had no jurisdiction of
judgment debtor); Appeal of Crosson, 125 Pa. 380, 17 AUt. 423 (1889).
6. Kreps v. Webster, 85 Colo. 572, 277 Pac. 471 (1929); Metz v.Hicklin, 126 Kan.
516, 268 Pac. 823 (1928); Tonge v. Radford, 103 Pa. 131, 156 At. 814 (1931); see
FasassAxs, VoIm ExEcuiroN, JuDiaL AND PtOBATr S.'a..s (3d ed.) §§ 48, 49. Contra:
Ritter v. Henshaw, 7 Iowa 97 (1858).
7. In equity: Day v. Graham, 6 Ill. 435 (1844); Leewark v. Carter, 117 Ind. 206, 20
N. E. 119 (1889); Wolford v. Phelps, 25 Ky. 31 (1829). Lien on land: Geoghegan v. Ditto,
59 Ky. 433 (1859). Money had and received: Dresser v. Kronberg, 108 Mie. 423, 81 At.
487 (1911) ; Hoxter v. Poppleton, 9 Ore. 481 (1881).
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to a sheriff's sale,8 so that a purchaser took title to property sold on execution
although the debtor had no title, but this mistaken concept now receives no recognition. 9 The weight of authority, however, holds that a purchaser at such sale acquires
nothing more than a quitclaim, or relinquishment of whatever interest the execution
debtor may have had in the land or chattels.1 0 But the rule is not so rigid as to
apply where the purchaser obtains no title because the sale itself is declared void,
and it has been held that in these circumstances a bona fide purchaser is entitled to
recover the price paid. 1 The rule is also relaxed where there is a deficiency in land
sold by the acre, the purchaser receiving an abatement of the price where a smaller
number of acres is received than was bargained for. 12
Where the defect in the purchaser's title is due to the sheriff's negligent
conduct of the proceedings, in some jurisdictions an action may be maintained
against that officer.' 3
In some states if the failure of title is due to an irregularity in the sale the purchase price may be recovered if the money is still in
the sheriff's hands. 14 In the instant case it would seem that by the terms of the
statute, the sheriff was made responsible to the purchaser for all irregularities in
the conduct of the sale. Finding the sheriff a proper party defendant, it becomes
difficult upon analysis of the court's reasoning, to discover why a recovery was not
allowed. The prevailing opinion seems to presume that the purchaser at the time of
the sale would foresee the possibility that a court of competent jurisdiction might
cancel the sheriff's deed and set aside the sale. The statute15 is a relaxation of the
8. "The only cases of sale which can with propriety be said to be made in market
overt with us, are sales made under the probate act under writs of execution, and of goods
found or, estrays, which being regulated by statute, public advertisements made, and
the sale effected by known officers of the Government, or under the expressed provislons
of the laws, ought to inure against the owner." Heacock v. Walker, I Tyler 344, 345
(Vt. 1802).
9. Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Newklrk v.
Dalton, 17 Ill.
413 (1856).
10. Figh v. Taber, 203 Ala. 253, 82 So. 495 (1919); Hayes v. Carey, 287 Ill. 274, 122
N. E. 524 (1919); Cramer & Sons v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 AtI. 42 (1916); Trefry
v. Younger, 226 Mass. 5, 114 N. E. 1033 (1917); Butler v. Fitzgerald, 43 Neb. 192, 61
N. W. 640 (1895); United Shoe Repairing Mach. Co. v. Asournanakis, 172 Wis. 102,
178 N. W. 312 (1920).
11. Ritter v. Henshaw, 7 Iowa 97 (1858); Slater v. Lamb, 150 Mass. 239, 22 N. E.
892 (1889) ; Schwinger v. Hickok, 53 N. Y. 280 (1873) ; State ex rel. Shull v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 W. Va. 184, 94 S. E. 123 (1917). A leading case, England
v. Clark, 5 Ill. 487 (1843), denied the purchaser a recovery against the judgmentcreditor because of want of privity between the purchaser and the creditor. The answer
to this proposition is that there need be no privity of contract between the parties In
order to support an action for money had and received but that resulting from the
possession of another's property to which he has no right. Keene v. Sage, 75 Me. 138
(1883); Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. 574 (1822).
Several states have given a statutory
remedy for the price paid. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr. (1920) § 756; Omo Grx. CODF (Page,
1931) § 11703; PA. STAT. ANe. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 2448.
12. Carmody v. Brooks, 40 Md. 240 (1874); Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N. C. 196,
51 S. E. 926 (1905).
13. Watson v. Todd, 5 Mass. 271 (1809); Mulford v. Roberts, 112 Miss. 573, 73 So.
609 (1917).
14. Highlower v. Handlin, 27 Ark. 20 (1871); Bartholomew v. Warner, 32 Conn. 98
(1864); Seller v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 264 (1865).
15. GA. CODa Asm. (Michie, 1926) § 6059. The purchaser at judicial sales Is not

19361

RECENT DECISIONS

common law doctrine of caveat emptor. Although the sale was declared void because
of an excessive levy, L the court applied caveat emptor to the would-be purchaser.
It seems illogical to hold that a purchaser can "beware" where there is no sale and
when in fact he is not a purchaser. As the dissenting judge observed, any disability
in the purchaser to recover from the levying officer must be predicated upon some
legal principle other than caveat emptor. The plaintiff parted with a valuable consideration and received nothing in return. If he had not paid the money he could not
have been compelled to do so. 17 Hence he should be entitled to recover for money
had and received in an action against the proper party, the sheriff. There is no
doubt that in good conscience the money belongs to the plaintiff. If the facts
showed the purchaser knew of the invalidity of the sale, he would be precluded from
a recovery on well established principles or if he made payment with knowledge of
all the facts, mistaking their legal effect,' 8 he would be in the same situation. This
decision may be explained on the ground that the court is formulating a blanket
policy which virtually compels a purchaser at a judicial sale to take notice of the
entire proceeding, as well as of the title he intends to acquire.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-SuBLEASE AND ASSIGNMENT-UNDERLEASE

OF

PART

OF

PaRISEs.--A leased a storeroom to B from February 10, 1929, until April 30, 1932,
at a rental of $500 per month. Some days later B leased to C half the premises for
the remainder of the term at $400 per month. Shortly before February 1, 1931 C
abandoned the premises. B paid A the rent up to this date. B sued C for the arrears
and settled with C on October 1, 1931 for $500 and a reassignment of the lease. In
January, 1932 A sued B and C jointly for rent due. B offered no defense. The trial
court found that the agreement betwveen B and C was an assignment pro tanto and
held C liable for one-half the rent for the remainder of the term. C appealed on
the grounds, inter alia, that the agreement was a sublease and that conceding it to be
an assignment, the reassignment ended his liability. Held, that the agreement was
an assignment pro tanto but that C was liable only for one-half the rent up to the
date of the reassignment. Judgment reversed. Entroth Shoc Co. v. Johnson, 85
S. W. (2d) 686 (Ky. 1935).
The general distinction between a sublease and an assignment of a leasehold is well
established. If the tenant transfers his entire interest in the term, he assigns; if he
retains any part of the term in himself he sublets.' The simplicity of the rule is
bound to look to the appropriation of the proceeds of the sale, nor to the returns made
by the officer, nor is he required to see that the officer has complied fully with all these
regulations prescribed in such cases. All such irregularities create quEstions of liabilities
between the officer and parties interested in the sale. The innocent purchaser is bound
only to see that the officer has competent authority to sell, and that he is apparently
proceeding to sell under the prescribed forms.
16. An excessive levy and sale thereunder is such an irregularity that the sale must be
set aside; the rule that no more property should be sold at an execution sale than is
reasonably necessary to satisfy the judgment debt rests on public policy, and needs no
statute to support it. Fortin v. Sedgwick, 133 Iowa 233, 110 N. W. 460 (1907); Mullins
v. Southwood, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1246, 103 S. W. 324 (1903); cf. Allen v. Kenyon, 41 Mich.
231, 1 N. W. 863 (1879).

17.

Getman v. Harrison, 112 La. 435, 36 So. 486 (1904); Wanser v. De Myse, 188

N. Y. 378, 80 N. E. 1088 (1907).
18. See Comment (1935) 4 FoRanA.r L. Rsv. 466.
1.

Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 Ill. 318, 21 N. E. 920 (1889); Consolidated Coach
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marred by the difficulty encountered in determining the existence of the necessary
reversionary interest. As pointed out in one decision, 2 part of the diversity of opinion
in the cases dealing with the problem may be traced to the construction of th9 word
"term." Although the courts agree that if the underlease is to terminate prior to
the time provided for in the original lease, it is a subletting, 8 some jurisdictions have
given the impression that it is to this time element alone that "term" refers. 4 Others
insist that there may be such a reversion as would be fatal to assignment despite
the grant of the remainder of the time.5 The fact that space is retained as in the
principal case does not in most jurisdictions change the general rule, and it is held
that if all the interest in the part conveyed is passed, there is an assignment.0
When an assignment is made, the relationship of privity of estate is created between
the assignee and the lessor.1 While such privity continues to exist,3 the assignee is
Corp. v. Consolidated Realty Co., 251 Ky. 614, 65 S. W. (2d) 724 (1933); Marcelle, Inc.
v. Sol & S. Marcus Co., 274 Mass. 469, 175 N. E. 83 (1931); Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61
N. Y. 382 (1875); THompsoN, REAL PROPERTY (1924) § 1372; TIFFANY, REA= PROPERTY
LANDLORD AND TENANT (5th ed. 1934) § 229.
(2d ed. 1920) § 55 (a); 2 McADA,
2. See St. Joseph & St. L. R. Co. v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 135 Mo. 173, 190,
36 S. W. 602, 605 (1896).
3. Backus v. Duffy, 103 Cal. App. 775, 284 Pac. 954 (1930); Bowling v. Garber, 250
Ky. 137, 61 S.W. (2d) 1102 (1933); Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. 189, 49 N. W. 742 (1891);
Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569 (1867) ; Agen v. Nelson, 51 Wash. 431, 98 Pac. 1115 (1909).
4. The following cases hold that the reservation by the lessee of a new rent and a power
of re-entry upon default will not defeat assignment, and also indicate that, with the exception of those affecting the period of time, no other covenants would defeat an assignment.
Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 Ill. 318, 21 N.-E. 920 (1889); Indian Refining Co. v.
Roberts, 97 Ind. App. 615, 181 N. E. 283 (1932) (held sublease because undertenant had
right to terminate on ten days' notice); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Consolidated Realty
Co., 251 Ky. 614, 65 S. W. (2d) 724 (1933); Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. 189, 49 N. W.
742 (1891); St. Joseph & St. L. R. Co. v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 135 Mo. 173,
36 S. W. 602 (1896); Stewart v. Long Island R. Co. 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200 (1886);
Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc., 239 N. Y. 87, 145 N. E. 748 (1924).
5. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Parker, 160 So. 220 (Ala. 1935) (right of re-entry);
Backus v. Duffy, 103 Cal. App. 775, 284 Pac. 954 (1930); Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173
La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931) (overriding royalty in oillease); McNeil v. Kendall, 128 Mass.
245 (1880) (underlease of part of premises provided for easements in part retained by
lessee); Dunlap v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 (1881) (right of re-entry); Marcelle, Inc. v.
Sol & S. Marcus Co., 274 Mass. 469, 175 N. E. 83 (1931) (close commercial relationship of
lessee and undertenant); Saling v. Flesh, 85 Mont. 106, 277 Pac. 612 (1929); Davis v. Vidal,
105 Tex. 444, 151 S. W. 290 (1912) (right of re-entry); Barnes v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
167 Wash. 609, 9 P. (2d) 1095 (1932) (original lessee was to occupy premises and conduct
his own business thereon).
6. Jordan v. Scott, 38 Cal. App. 739, 177 Pac. 504 (1918); Babcock v. Scoville, 56
Ill. 461 (1870); Cook v. Jones, 96 Ky. 283, 28 S. W. 960 (1894); Craig v. Summers, 47
Minn. 189, 49 N. W. 742 (1891); Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382 (1875); TnTANY
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 172.
7. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Parker, 160 So. 220 (Ala. 1935); Barkaus v.
Producers' Fruit Co., 192 Cal. 200, 219 Pac. 435 (1923); Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co.,
129 Ill. 318, 21 N. E. 920 (1889); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Consolidated Realty Co.,
251 Ky. 614, 65 S. W. (2d) 724 (1933); Bell v. American Protective League, 163 Mass. 558,
40 N. E. 857 (1895); Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382 (1875).
8. Abandonment will not terminate privity of estate. See Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1102.
But reassignment will. Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223, 27 Pac. 612 (1891); Sexton v. Chicago
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liable to the lessor upon all covenants contained in the original lease O which run with
the land, as for example, rent.10 However, in a pro tanio assignment the assignee
becomes liable for rent only in proportion to the part of the premises held."1
It is uniformly accepted that the form and wording of the instrument is immaterial
in determining the relationship created.12 As a result in many instances the undertenant is held to be an assignee when he had no intention of assuming such status.
In the instant case the fact that all the rent was reserved to B and that he sued C
and received a settlement therefor, dearly indicated that the parties had intended to
create a sublease and a relationship of landlord and tenant limited to themselves.
Assuming a state of facts where C has contracted with B at a lesser sum than the
proportionate rent, or where C has paid B the total amount of rent reserved in the
underlease, the hardship becomes clearer as C would still be liable to A. Since the
assignee cannot discharge his liability to the landlord by payment to the assignor, the
payment is on made under a mistake of law and as such, cannot, in most jurisdictions,
be recovered. 13 Even in those jurisdictions where a recovery may be had against the
assignor, taking into consideration that in most of these situations the latter is
insolvent, the finding of assignment is equally harsh. A recent New York case 14
considered another difficulty which is apt to occur in the case of an underlease of
part of the premises. It was suggested that where the lessee and the undertenant
agree that the latter need be bound only so long as the former continues to occupy
and do business, it would be unfair to hold the undertenant for rent for the remainder
of the term after the lessee has ceased to occupy. The Court of Appeals took notice
of this inequity but observed that it was a matter for legislative relief.
Both the New York decision and the principal case call attention to the arbitrary
manner in which the courts test these underleases. The method is analogous to that
applied by the courts in distinguishing borderline relationships of agency and sale
where the contract is ambiguous.15 It is submitted that this approach is particularly
inapplicable to the present problem, since, in any event the landlord has a right of
action against the lessee. Moreover, bad faith is rarely involved in underleases.
318, 21 N. E. 920 (1889) ; Bell v. American Protective League, 163 Mas.
Storage Co., 129 Ill.
558, 40 N. E. 857 (1895) ; Cohen v. Todd, 130 Mlinn. 227, 153 N. W. 531 (1915).
361, 46 N. E. 1105 (1896); Indian Refining
9. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 Ill.
Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ind. App. 615, 181 N. E. 283 (1932); Grundin v. Carter, 99 Mas. 15
(1868); Trask v. Graham, 47 Blinn. 571, 50 N. W. 917 (1891); Stewart v. Long Island R.
Co., 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200 (1886).

10. Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223, 27 Pac. 612 (1891); Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co.,
129 Il. 318, 21 N. E. 920 (1889); Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E.

200 (1886); Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S. W. 290 (1912).
11. Bancroft v. Vizard, 202 Ala. 618, 81 So. 560 (1919); Babcock v. Scoville, 56 InI.
461 (1870); Hollywood v. First Parish, 192 Mass. 269, 78 N. E. 124 (1906); Craig v.
Summers, 47 Binn. 189, 49 N. W. 742 (1891); Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382 (1875);
Barnes v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 167 Wash. 607, 9 P. (2d) 1095 (1932).
12. "It is immaterial what form of instrument is used, whether it purports to be an
assignment or a new lease." Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382, 391 (1875), quoted with
approval in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 254,
258, 194 N. E. 745, 746 (1935). To the same effect: Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Consolidated Realty Co., 251 Ky. 614, 65 S.W. (2d) 724 (1933); Marcelle, Inc. v. Sol & S.
Marcus Co., 274 Mass. 469, 175 N. E. 83 (1931); Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. 189, 49
N. W. 742 (1891); Holden v. Tidwell, 37 Okla. 553, 133 Pac. 54 (1913).
13. Comment (1935) 4 FoRDHAir L. Rv. 466, 470.
14. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 254, 194
N. E. 745 (1935).
15. M ac
, AGErC

(2d ed. 1914) §§ 47, 48.
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It is clear that in those states where the time element alone seems to be controlling,
great care must be taken to insure against possible hardship resulting from judicial
interpretation of the agreement. By providing for payment direct to the original
landlord, the hazard of double payments may be precluded. By reserving some period
of time 16 in the lessee, the subtenant may be assured that he has created a sublease.
Neglect to do this may result in the discovery by the undertenant at a later date, that
what he regarded as a sublease was in fact an assignment carrying with it unforeseen
liabilities.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO
THE SERVANT OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR UNDER DOCTRINE OP INHERENT

DANGER.-The defendant, an illuminating company, hired A, an independent contractor, to install certain electrical transformers. A, in turn, let the work to X, whose
servant is the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the work was inherently dangerous.
The plaintiff was injured when the boom of a crane came in contact with high tension
1
wires. The defendant had warned the plaintiff of the existence of these wires. Held,
one judge dissenting, that, although the doctrine of inherent danger inures to the
benefit of third parties, it does not exist in favor of the injured servant of an independent contractor. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. O'Connor, 197 N. E. 428
(Ohio App. 1935).
The doctrine of the employer's non-liability for the negligence of an independent
contractor 2 has been progressively qualified and pierced by exceptions with the rapid4
3
advancement of industry. One exception, known as the doctrine of inherent danger,
16. The period reserved may be infinitesimal but if the lessee is to regain possession before
the time called for as terminating the original lease, it will be a sublease. See cases cited
note 3, supra. An interesting question is to be noted in New York as to whether or not
a covenant calling for the surrender to the lessee upon the expiration of the term would defeat
an assignment. In Collins v. Hasbrouck, 56 N. Y. 157 (1874) the underlease contained
such a covenant and also provided for a new rent and a right of re-entry. The court
held it to be a sublease. In Ganson v. Tifft, 71 N. Y. 48 (1877) the court approved this
case and apparently considered the controlling point in the Collins case to have been the
clause calling for the surrender, and upon similar facts held the agreement in question a
sublease. But see Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200 (1886) wherein
this reasoning is criticized.
1. Discussion of the warning is apparently only dictum. But a consideration of warning
is an all-important question in other jurisdictions, as will be indicated below. Stevens v.
United Gas & Electric Co., 73 N. H. 159, 60 Atl. 848 (1905).
2. Navigazione Alta Italia v. Vale, 221 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915); Douglass v. Peck
& Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 95 Atl. 22 (1915); Jefferson v. Jameson & Morse Co., 165 111.
138, 46 N. E. 272 (1896); see Roper Lumber Co. v. Hewitt, 287 Fed. 120, 121 (C. C. A.
4th, 1923).
3. To the general rule of non-liability of the general employer there are the following
exceptions: (1) where the work is unlawful; (2) where the work creates a nuisance; (3)
where the work is inherently dangerous; (4) where the employer knowingly hires an Incompetent and untrustworthy contractor; (5) where the employer assumes control over
servants of the independent contractor or interferes materially with the manner of the
work; (6) where the employer is under a statutory duty to see that the work Is properly
done; (7) where the employer or his agents are guilty of negligence themselves, Douglass
v. Peck &Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 95 Atl. 22 (1915). The doctrine is applicable as between
contractor and sub-contractor as well as between general employer and independent contractor. Wilson v. Hibbert, 194 Fed. 838 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912); Carson v. Blodgett Const.
Co., 189 Mo. App. 120, 174 S. W. 447 (1915).
4. This exception is based upon the unusual danger which inheres in the mere perform-
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removes the insulating effect of the independent contractor,5 and places upon the
general employer the non-delegable duty to use due care when the work to be per-

formed is in its nature dangerous.8 The presence of an independent contractor results in the problem not of whether the injured party shall recover, but from whom
he shall recover. Although most courts are in complete harmony as to the rule
T
itself, in its application to particular cases the results have been generally discordant
a result, perhaps, of the difficulty of determining whether particular activities are
inherently dangerous.8 Inherent dangers are generally divided into two categories:
0
(1) where the nature of the work is such that accident is practically unavoidable;
(2) where the kind of work may ordinarily occasion injury to others if certain precautions are omitted.10 The second classification is applicable in a literal sense to
almost any kind of work, and its adoption would naturally lead to the conclusion that
the employer is ordinarily bound at his peril to see that the work is carefully perOnly by abrogating the basic rule which
formed by the independent contractor."
exempts the employer from liability for the contractor's negligence can full effect be
given to the latter classification.' 2 In considering the doctrine of inherent danger
the court in the instant case, while admitting that the doctrine is applicable where
a member of the general public is injured, denies the benefits of the rule to an
injured servant of the contractor. Like many other issues concerning the liability
of employers, the cases involving the right of a servant to recover from a general emance of the work aside from any negligence of the contractor or his servants. See Paltey
v. Egan, 200 N. Y. 33, 91, 93 N. E. 267, 269 (1910); Bower v. Peate, 1 Q. B. D. 321, 326
(1876). It is the duty of due care that one owes to society in ordering the doing of
work that is inherently dangerous. See Water Co. v. Ware, 83 U. S. S66, 574 (1872). The
servant, even though within the exception, must prove his case of negligence, that he was
free from negligence and that the work was inherently dangerous. Loony v. Prest-O-Lite
Co., 65 Ind. App. 617, 117 N. E. 678 (1917). Danger must come from either (1) the condition of the property, or (2) the use to which the property is put; but the mere negligent
act of the contractor is not denoted as "dangerous." Davis v. Whiting & Son, 201 Mass.
91, 87 N. E. 199 (1909). Contra: Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa. 272, 161 Ad. 362 (1932)
(court disregards doctrine of inherent danger).
5. Besner v. Central Trust Co. of New York, 230 N. Y. 357, 130 N. E. 577, 23 A. L. R.
1081 (1921). "An independent contractor is one who undertakes to do specific pieces of
work for other persons without submitting himself to their control . . . representing his
employer only as to the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is accomplished." Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N. C. 289, 300, 97 S. E. 33, 38 (1918); see Davis
Bakery, Inc. v. Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 634, 124 S. E. 411, 413 (1924).
6. Besner v. Central Trust Co. of New York, 230 N. Y. 357, 130 N. E. 577 (1921);
Vickers v. Kanawha & I. W. V. R. Co., 64 W. Va. 474, 63 S. E. 367 (1903); see Bower v.
Peate, 1 Q. B. D. 321, 328 (1876); cf. Davis Bakery, Inc. v. Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 124 S. E.
411 (1924).
7. Carson v. Blodgett Coast. Co., 189 Mo. App. 120, 174 S. W. 447 (1915); see Foard
Co. v. State of Maryland, 219 Fed. 827, 833 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) ; Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Coast.
Co., Inc., 154 Misc. 892, 897, 278 N. Y. Supp. 635, 641 (Sup. Ct. 1935); S.VLIo.D, Tonrs
(7th ed. 1928) 135; RESTATESmNT, ToRrS (1934) §§ 409-429.
3. Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S. W. (2d) 617 (1928),
refusing to follow Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S. W. 16 (1912).
9. Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N. C. 289, 97 S. E. 33 (1918).
10. Wilson v. Hlibbert, 194 Fed. 838 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912); Parson v. Johnson, 203 N. Y.
337, 101 N. E. 879 (1913); see Engel v. Eureka Club, 137 N. Y. 100, 105, 32 N. E. 1052,
1053 (1893).
11. Laffery v. United States Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349, 111 Pac. 498 (1910).
12. Ibid. (compare majority opinion with dissent).
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ployer for injuries sustained in the course of inherently dangerous work are not entirely in accord. 13 In some cases the doctrine is deemed equally controlling whether
the injury was sustained by a servant of an independent contractor or by a third
person, 14 while in other jurisdictions such enlarged liability in respect to intrinsically
15
However, where the
dangerous work does not inure to the benefit of the servant.
general employer is held to the exercise of due care towards the servant, it is deemed
that by warning the servant of the existence of an inherent danger, the employer has
10
sufficiently performed the duty so as to absolve himself from such enlarged liability.
The fact that the servant nevertheless performs the work after such warning results
in the conclusion that he has assumed any risk.17 To allow the general employer to
discharge his duty by a mere warning is to impede the present tendency toward the
overthrow of the dogmatic formula of the common law, and in effect to reaffirm the
18
In some
employer's non-liability for the negligence of the independent contractor.
jurisdictions the effect of notice is obviated by holding that where the work is Inherently'dangerous the employer owes the same duty to the servants of the contractor
as to his own employees, 19 while in others it is held that this duty is merely limited
2°
Realizing the futility
to that of the employer to any invitee entering the premises.
13. Blasting is inherently dangerous. Buddin v. Fortunate, 16 Daly 195, 10 N. Y. Supp.
115 (C. P. 1890); Watson v. Black Mountain Ry. Co., 164 N. C. 176, 80 S. E. 175 (1913).
Contra: Wiener v. Hammel, 14 N. Y. Supp. 365 (N. Y. City Ct. 1891) (blasting not Inherently dangerous). Decisions are not in accord as to whether mining operations are Inherently dangerous. Laffery v. United States Gypsum Co., 83 Kan, 349, 111 Pac. 498
(1910) (mining not inherently dangerous).
14. Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S. W. (2d) 617 (1928);
Paltey v. Egan, 200 N. Y. 83, 93 N. E. 267 (1910); Braun v. Buffalo Gen'l Elec. Co., 200 N.
Y. 484, 94 N. E. 206 (1911); Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Brewing Co., 219 N. Y. 415,
114 N. E. 808 (1916); Watson v. Black Mountain Ry. Co., 164 N. C. 176, 80 S. E. 175
(1913) ; cf. Omaha Bridge Co. v. Hargadine, 5 Neb. (unofficial) 418, 98 N. W. 1071 (1904).
15. Schip v. Pabst Brewing Co., 64 Minn. 22, 66 N. W. 3 (1896); Salmon v. Kansas
City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S. W. 16 (1912).
16. Pettingall v. William Porter & Son, Inc., 219 Mass. 347, 107 N. E. 269 (1914);
Samuelson v. Cleveland Iron Mining Co., 49 Mich. 164, 13 N. W. 499 (1882); Stevens v.
United Gas & Electric Co., 73 N. H. 159, 60 Atl. 848 (1905); Kaw Boiler Works v. Frymer,
100 Okla. 81, 227 Pac. 453 (1914); Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co., 113 Tex. 456, 258
S. W. 803 (1924) (merely notifying contractor, without notice to servant, insufficient).
17. Crimmins v. Booth, 202 Mass. 17, 88 N. E. 449 (1909); see Douglas, Vicarious Liab~iiy and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584, 594-604; cf. Hutchinson v. Richmond Safety Gate Co., 247 Mo. 71, 152 S. W. 52 (1912) ; Kowalsky v. The Conreco Co., Inc.,
264 N. Y. 125, 190 N. E. 206 (1934).
18. See Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Const. Co., Inc., 154 Misc. 892, 897-898, 278 N. Y. Supp.
635, 641-642 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Comment (1930) 39 YAL, L. J. 861 et seq.; SA=OND, ToRT
(7th ed. 1928) 135.
19. In New York, under Olive v. Whitney Marble Co., 103 N. Y. 292, 8 N. E. 552 (1886),
the court denied that any such duty 'existed. It is apparent that under the N. Y. EmPLoYER's L _enrr ACT (1930) § 2 (formerly N. Y. LABOR LAW [1909] § 200, as amended
by N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 352, § 1) an essential change in the doctrine has been made In that
it now holds that the employer owes the same duty to the servant of the Independent contractor as to his own employes where the employer furnishes the equipment. See Hess v.
Bernheimer & Schwartz Brewing Co., 219 N. Y. 415, 418, 114 N. E. 808, 808 (1916); MacLean v. Studebaker Bros. Co. of New York, 221 N. Y. 475, 478, 117 N. E. 951, 951. But
cf. Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 81 So. 832 (1919).
20. Samuelson v. Cleveland Iron Mining Co., 49 Mich. 164, 13 N. W. 499 (1882);
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of attempting to harmonize the decisions so that the amorphous condition of the
law can be molded into generalizations sufficiently broad to envelope the countless
and varied situations which arise, some authorities have resigned themselves to a
pragmatic approach in deciding each case.2 1 It has been suggested that rather than
cope with the many illusory subtleties and distinctions permeating the law of independent contractors, it would be more equitable to hold the employer in all cases for
the negligence of the former within the scope of the hiring, since the employer is
benefiting by the work. 22 No doubt, the courts in their attempt justly to compensate the injured servant have created chaos in promulgating a vast number of exceptions to the common law liability. It is no less significant to note that some
Workmen's Compensation Acts have adopted provisions which reflect the present
tendency to abrogate the common law rule by providing that although the subcontractor is principally liable, the independent contractor is liable for injuries sustained by the servants of the sub-contractor, who has not complied with the provisions
of the Act.ea By this legislation the servant is assured of compensation for any injury. Proper legislation in response to the social significance of this problem could
logically extend the relationship between contractor and sub-contractor by incorporating into the statute similar provisions governing the relationship between employer and contractor. 24

NEGLIGENCE-AUTooBILES-DRIvER'S LiABiIrrY To NoN-PAYING AD SEL INVITED PASSENGERm-The plaintiff's intestate, a hitchhiker, was killed when the
defendant's car, on the wrong side of the road, collided head-on with a truck. The
wife of the deceased sued to recover damages from the driver of the automobile.
On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held, one justice dissenting, that the
defendant's duty to use ordinary care was not abrogated by the fact that the deceased
was self-invited. Spencer v. Jones, 179 AUt. 75 (Pa. 1935).
Following the leading case of Avery v. Thompson,' the majority rule in the United
States requires the operator of a vehicle to exercise ordinary care, in order not to
increase the normal risks which a guest assumes upon entering the vehicle.2 Adopting
this requirement of ordinary care, these courts rejected the Massachusetts view
Riley v. Jersey Leather Co., 100 N. J. L. 300, 126 AtI. 457 (1924); see Sciolara v. Asch,
198 N. Y. 77, 82, 91 N. E. 263, 264 (1910). But cf. Kowval-y v. The Conreco Co., Inc., 264
N. Y. 125, 190 N. E. 206 (1934) (work consisted of removing a nuisance; court refused
to find any duty on employer to keep the premises safe); Davis Bakery, Inc. v. Dozier, 139
Va. 628, 124 S. E. 411 (1918). However, in view of the common law rule, it is not amiss
to observe that there may be circumstances under which a rule casting on the general employer the full liability of a master in respect to the servants of the independent contractor
might operate inequitably.
21. For a discussion, see Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Const. Co., Inc., 154 Misc. 892, 278
N.Y. Supp. 635, (Sup. Ct. 1935). See SAL0roD, ToRTs (7th ed. 1928) 135; Douglas, loc. cit.
supra note 17, at 603.
22.

See (1932) 81 U. Or PA. L. Rav. 232.

23. N.Y. WoREaxM's Com. LAw (1922) § 56. For similar statutes, see Comment (1930)
39 YsrA
L. J. 861, 873, n. 59.
24. See Douglas, loc. cit. spra note 17, at 603-604; Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
861 et seq.
1. 117 Mle. 120, 103 AUt. 4 (1918).
2. Galloway v. Perkins, 198 Ala. 638, 73 So. 956 (1917); Beard v. Mlusmeler, 1S8 Ky.
153, 164 S. W. 319 (1914); Roy v. Kirn, 208 Mlich. 571, 175 N. W. 475 (1919); Thorne v.
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enunciated in Massaletti v. Fitzroy3 which predicated liability to a non-paying passenger only upon proof of the exercise of so slight a degree of diligence as would
constitute gross negligence.4 The courts which followed the Massachusetts rule
adopted the gratuitous bailment theory of Coggs v. Bernardu and followed this analogy
as applied in the earliest gratuitous guest case in England, decided in 1869. 6 Cognizant
of the anomalies in this doctrine, the great weight of judicial opinion refused to accept
it. Among the various reasons advanced for this rejection were: (1) because liability
exists wherever the care called for by the circumstances is not exercised, repudiating,
largely as a matter of terminology, any theory recognizing degrees of negligence; 1
(2) because of its fundamental unsoundness as applied to any other relationship than
one for the sole benefit of the non-paying passenger,8 and (3) because one entrusted with a human life should be duty-bound to exercise a higher degree of care
9
than a gratuitous bailee owes to a "block of wood."
Under the majority rule, especially where the host carried liability insurance,
10
created a condition which called for
numerous suits between hosts and guests,
action by the legislature."L
Collusion, perjury, and a frequently-sensed, but seldom

provable, lack of cooperation by the assured, too easily and unfairly enabled the
plaintiff to mulct the insurers. 12

The ensuing drain on the funds of insurance com-

panies eventually goaded them into action.

Asserting that insurance rates increased

in proportion to the frequency and amounts of recoveries, and that, therefore, the
8
they so swayed legislative
general public sustained the ultimate burden of loss,'
Lampros, 52 Nev. 417, 288 Pac. 601 (1930); Notes (1922) 20 A. L. R. 1014; (1930) 65 id.
952; 5-6 HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA or AUTOmOBIL

LAW (9th ed. 1931)

222.

3. 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917).
4. Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S. E. 116 (1929); McKenna v. Smith, 275
Mass. 149, 175 N. E. 474 (1931); Gale v. Wilber, 163 Va. 211, 175 S. E. 739 (1934); To
Selle v. Terpstra, 180 Wash. 73, 38 P. (2d) 379 (1934); Grandhagen v. Grandhagen, 199
Wis. 315, 225 N. W. 935 (1929).
5. 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 913, 92 Eng. Reprints 107, 110 (Q. B. 1703).
6. Moffatt v. Bateman, L. R. 3 P. C. 115 (1869) (where bolt broke and the horses ran
away, a gratuitous invited guest was required to prove gross negligence).
7. Wittstruck v. Lee, 252 N. W. 874 (S. D. 1934). Negligence is absolute, consisting
in the failure to exercise that degree of care which the ordinary reasonable man would
use under the circumstances. HARPER, TORTS (1933) 75; Comment (1905) 18 HARv. L.
Contra:
Rav. 536; cf. Dalton v. Hamilton Hotel Co., 242 N. Y. 481, 152 N. E. 268 (1926).
Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917); see Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa.
541, 543, 107 Atl. 383, 384 (1919).
8. White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger (1934) 20
where the
VA. L. REV.326, 342. Gross negligence cannot fairly be used to predicate liability
relationship was for the benefit and convenience of the driver or for the mutual benefit of
both parties.
9. It is only sensible and humane to require the exercise of ordinary care towards a
guest at sufferance who is there with the tacit consent of the driver. Wurtzberger v. Oglesby,
222 Ala. 151, 131 So. 9 (1930); BABBITT, MOTOR VEmHcLE LAW (4th ed. 1933) 1153.
10. (1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rv.928, 929.
11. "The legislative sense of fair play seems to have been shocked by the perverted
use of the law of negligence in guest cases to recover indirectly against insurance companies
by suits against indifferent and irresponsible hosts; in some cases being a conspiracy between guest and host against the insurance carrier." Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625,
626, 23 P. (2d) 520, 520 (1933).
12. (1933) 22 CALIF. L. RV.119, 120; Comment (1928) 38 YA=Z L. J. 267, 268; see
Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 224, 234 N. W. 581, 584 (1931).
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opinion as to obtain statutory reforms, virtually adopting the gross negligence rule
in twenty-four states.14 Conduct which manifests heedlessness,25 gross negligence, 1 6
or reckless disregard of the rights of others, 17 are some of the bases of statutory
liability. A few statutes went so far as to negative any liability to non-paying
guests.' s These statutes have been held unconstitutional'10 In the absence of
13. Legis. (1932) 18 IowA L. REv. 78, 85.
14. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) act 5128, § 141 4 (intoxication and wilful misconduct): Stoots v. Blckle, 19 P. (2d) 73 (Cal. 1933); Colo. Laws 1931, c. 118 (intentional,
intoxication, wilful, wanton disregard); CoNx. Gus. STAT. (1930) § 1628 (intentional,
heedlessness, or reckless disregard of the rights of others): Doody v. Rogers, 116 Conn.
713, 164 At]. 641 (1933); Metcalf v. Reynolds, 267 N. Y. 52, 195 N. E. 681 (1935); Del.
Laws 1929, c. 270 (no liability whatsoever): superseded by Del. Laws 1933, c. 26 (intentional, or wilful wanton disregard); InAHo CODE Azzmz.
(1932) § 48-901 (intentional, gross
negligence or reckless disregard): McCoy v. Krengel, 52 Idaho 626, 17 P. (2d) 547 (1932);
ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 95a, § 43 (wilful, wanton and misconduct): Baumeister
v. Bowers, 271 Il. App. 332 (1933); IND. STAT. A,.
(Burns, 1929) § 10142.1 (intent or
reckless disregard); Conconower v. Stoddard, 96 Ind. App. 287, 182 N. E. 466 (1932);
IOWA CODE (1931) § 5026-bi (intoxication or reckless operation): Siesseger v. Puth, 213
Iowa 164, 239 N. W. 46 (1931), Bailey v. Bryant, 127 Neb. 843, 257 N. W. 241 (1934);
KAN. REv. STAT. A.zzy. (Supp. 1933) § 8-122b (reckles and wanton negligence): Aduddell
v. Brighton, 141 Kan. 617, 42 P. (2d) 555 (1935); Ky. SnTT. (Carroll, Supp. 1931) § 12-7
(guest statute prohibiting damages except for intentional wrong held unconstitutional):
Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 534, 49 S. W. (2d) 347 (1932); Md. Laws 1931, c. 391 (gross
negligence-vetoed) ; Mlc. Comp. LAws (1929) § 4648 (gross negligence, wilful or wanton
misconduct): Wyma v. Van Anrooy, 260 Mich. 295, 244 N. W. 478 (1932); Mont. Laws
1931, c. 195 (gross negligence or reckless operation): McNair v. Berger, 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.
(2d) 834 (1932); NEB. Comn,. STAT. (Supp. 1931) § 39-1129 (intoxication or gross negligence): Gilbert v. Bryant, 125 Neb. 731, 251 N. W. 823 (1933); Nev. Laws 1933, c. 34 (intoxication, wilful misconduct or gross negligence); N. D. Laws 1931, c. 184, § 2 (intoxication, wilful misconduct or gross negligence): Posey v. Krogh, 259 N. W. 757 (N. D. 1934);
Ohio Laws 1933, § 6308-6 (wilful or wanton misconduct); Ore. Laws 1927, c. 342 (depriving guest of any recovery): declared invalid, Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac.
998 (1928), 61 A. L. R. 1236 (1929); OMa. CODE AN-. (1930) § 55-1209 (grosz negligence,
heedlessness, intentional, intoxication, reckless disregard): Monner v. Starker, 147 Ore. 118,
31 P. (2d) 1109 (1934); S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 590S (intentional act, heedlesness,
or reckless disregard): Lee v. Lott, 50 Ga. App. 39, 177 S. E. 92, foil. in 177 S. E. 97 (1934);
S. D. Laws 1933, c. 147 (gross negligence or wilful, wanton disregard) ; Twx. Am;. Civ. STAT.
(Vernon, Supp. 1935) art. 6701b (intentional act, heedlessness or reckless dizregard):
Munves v. Buckley, 70 S. W. (2d) 605 (Tex. 1934); VT. PUB. L.ws (1933) § 5113 (gross
or wilful negligence): Dessereau v. Walker, 105 Vt. 99, 163 At]. 632 (1933); Wash. Laws
1933, c. 18 (intentional); Wyo. REv. STAT. Azsr. (Courtright, 1931) § 72-701 (gross negligence, wilful or wanton misconduct). See Leachman and Gardere, Guest Statutes ard Irterpretations in Various Jurisdictions,BEsr's LsuRAncE NEws (July 10, 1933) 144, 145.
15. Trv. A.-. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1931) art. 6701b.
16. I Auo CODE ANx. (1932) § 48-901.
17. CoNr. GEY. STAT. (1930) § 1628.
18. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, Supp. 1931) § 12-7 (no liability except for intentional wrong);
Ore. Laws 1927, c. 342 (deprived guest of all recovery).
19. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 534, 49 S. W. (2d) 347 (1932); Stewart v. Houl:, 127
Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928), 61 A. L. R. 1241 (1929); cf. Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117
(1929).
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statute, the courts of the instant jurisdiction
have consistently adhered to the rule re20

quiring the exercise of ordinary care.
In determining the status of a "guest," an obvious distinction may be drawn between
"self-invited" and "host-invited" passengers. Nevertheless the great majority has

refused to recognize any legal distinction even in the case of hitchhikers. 21 In the
last analysis, a passenger by sufferance 22 is present by grace of the driver's consent
(excluding, of course, trespassers, of whose presence the driver is unawareS), and
24
as a result, should be accorded the same degree of care as a host-invited guest.
It is submitted that the entire problem of the liability of a driver to a non-paying
and self-invited guest is one which calls for legislative consideration and it should
not be handled indirectly by the courts. 25 On the other hand it is not difficult to
comprehend the inertia of the legislatures of the major states. Perhaps a reason
may be found in the realization that those methods which have been attempted are
ineffectual to alleviate entirely the conditions at which they are aimed. A stronger
motive may be traced to the desire not to limit the liability of the operator of a
potential instrumentality of destruction.

PARTNERSHnP-ToRTS-LIABILrY

FOR

INJURIES

TO WIFE

OF PARTNERi-The

plaintiff was injured while riding in an automobile driven by her husband, a member
of a copartnership. It was conceded that the husband was negligent and that at the
time of injury he was engaged in partnership business. Suit was brought against
the husband and his partner, both individually and as copartners. The sole defense
20. Curry v. Riggles, 302 Pa. 156, 153 Atl. 325 (1931); Richards v. Warner Co., 311
Pa. 50, 166 AtI. 496 (1933). These cases closely follow the ordinary care rule. But see
Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541, 546, 107 Ati. 383, 385 (1919). Although the courts have not
repudiated the narrow view of this case, they seem disinclined to favor a holding which
suggests the duty of merely slight diligence towards a person carried gratuitously for his
sole benefit. This would be a situation akin to the instant one.
21. Modern decisions almost unanimously hold that no admissible distinction exists between a self-invited and host-invited guest. Galloway v. Perkins, 198 Ala. 658, 73 So.
956 (1917) (invited by another passenger); Black v. Goldweber, 172 Ark. 862, 291 S. W.
76 (1927) (self-invited); Green v. Maddox, 168 Miss. 171, 149 So. 882 (1933) (hitchhiker); Holdhusen v. Schaible, 60 S. D. 275, 244 N. W. 392 (1932) (host-invited); Marple
v. Haddad, 103 W. Va. 508, 138 S. E. 113 (1927) (hitchhikers). Even the statutes refuge
to recognize any distinction. In general they define a "guest" as anyone accepting a ride
in a vehicle without compensation therefor. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) act 5128,
§ 14134. Contra: Crider v. Yolande Coal Co., 206 Ala. 71, 89 So. 285 (1921); Lutvln v.
Dopkus, 94 N. J. L. 64, 108 Ati. 862 (1920). Drawing an analogy to the law affecting
persons on real property, they say the legal status of the self-invited guests was that of
mere licensees, to whom the only obligation imposed is that of restraining from the perpetration of acts wantonly or willfully injurious.
22. "Sufferance" in this instance is to be distinguished from the technical real property
term which connotes a tenancy where one who entered lawfully by some affirmative right
holds over after the right has expired.
23. McGhee v. Birmingham News Co., 206 Ala. 487, 90 So. 492 (1921).
24. Black v. Goldweber, 172 Ark. 862, 291 S.W. 76 (1927); Munson v. Rupker, 96
Ind. App. 15, 148 N. E. 169 (1925), aff'd, 151 N. E. 101 (Ind. 1926); Grabau v. Pudwill, 45
N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124 (1920) (trespasser whom the driver saw was held to be a guest
by sufferance, with the implied consent of the driver, and was owed the duty of ordinary
care).
25. Legis. (1932) 18 IowA L. Rxv. 78, 85.
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alleged was the marital relation between the plaintiff and the negligent partner. Held,
two judges dissenting, that since the husband-partner was not liable to his wife,
neither the partnership nor the other partner as an individual could be held liable.
Caplanv. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935).
Although the Married Women's Acts conferred broad rights, many courts have
arrived at the conclusion that the legislative intent was not to permit personal tort
actions between husband and wife.1 In effect, one spouse cannot commit an actionable
tort upon the person of the other.2 Closely related to this rule is the question of the
liability of a master to his servant's wife for a tort committed upon her person by
the servant in the course of his employment. The courts, when faced with this
problem, have attained sharply conflicting results. Their chief point of disagreement
relates to the fundamental principle underlying the master's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.3 One line of decisions adopts the theory that the
liability of the servant is a condition precedent to a recovery against the master,
the liability of the latter being considered as wholly derivative from that of his
servant. 4 Accordingly, if the common-law fictional unity of the spouses renders the
servait immune from suit, his master cannot be required to respond in damages.
On the other hand, some courts, following the reasoning of the New York Court of
Appeals in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.,G regard the master's liability
as distinct and independent, and traceable not through the liability of the servant,
but through the character of the servant's act.0 Under this view, the act of the
servant is the act of the master. Hence, although the servant is protected by the bar
of the marital relationship against an action by his wife, no such bar exists in the
case of an action brought against the master for a wrongful act committed vicariously
by him. 7 This view would seem to be the sounder on principle s but when it is
realized that the master is entitled to recoup his loss from the servant whose act
1. See Comment (1935) 4 Fomrmb L. REv. 475-478.
2. Id. at 475.
3. Various theories for the nature of respondent superior have been advocated. The one
generally given is that the doctrine is based upon the maxim, qui facU per alm, facit er se.
See 1 Tnommso,, NEGrIGExcE (1901) § 51s; Hutchinson v. York, etc., Ry. Co., S Ex. 343,
350, 155 Eng. Reprints 150, 153 (1850). But cf. Legis. (1931) 45 HAnv L. R v. 171, 175,
in which it is submitted that the basis for the master's liability is social expediency.
4. Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20 37 A. L. R. 161
(1924); Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 At!. 669 (1932); Riser v. Ricer, 240
Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (1927) (under automobile owners' liability statute); Bellecon v.
Skifbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 (1932); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co.,
116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W. 297, 56 A. L. R. 331 (1927); Raines v. Mercer, 16S Tenn. 415, 55
S. W. (2d) 263 (1932) (auto owners' liability statute; plaintiff married driver before
suing owner).
5. 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928).
6. See note 7, infra.
7. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 At. 107 (1930)
(infant injured by father, defendant's employee); Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So.
755 (1932) (auto owner's liability statute) ; McLaurin v. McLaurin, 166 Mis. 180, 146 So.
877 (1933) semble; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff, 48 Ohio App. 412, 194 N. E. 429
(1933), rev'd on other grounds, 128 Ohio St. 469, 191 N. E. 761 (1933) ; Poulin v .Graham,
102 Vt. 307, 147 Atl. 698 (1929) ; Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co., 209 Wis. 489, 245 N. W.
159 (1932).
8. This is the view adopted by the American Law Institute. See REsTAmm:T, AmNCY-

(1933) § 217 (2), Comment b.
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caused such loss, 9 so that a recovery against the master is in effect a recovery against
the servant, it is apparent that to allow recovery violates the public policy which
prohibits personal tort actions between the spouses.10
In the instant case it is clear that the wife could not recover from her husband.11
Equally clear is it that she could obtain no judgment binding the firm assets. 12 A
partnership is not a legal entity,' 3 and to obtain a joint judgment in a tort action all
partners, including the husband, would have to be joined and served.1 4 There remains
the possibility of a recovery, under the doctrine of the Schubert Case, against the
other partner. The Uniform Partnership Act' 5 declares that the partnership is
liable "to the same extent" as the partner who committed the wrongful act. The
instant court, in adopting a literal construction of the statute, considered the other
partner's liability to be dependent upon the existence of liability in the acting
partner. Precedent for this construction is found in two decisions which, without
any attempt at analysis, applied the statute literally. 16 However, it is submitted that
the section of the Uniform Act defining partnership liability is merely a reiteration
of the common-law liability of partners for torts committed by a partner, which was
grounded upon the principle that as to each other partners were agents. 17 Hence, an
application of the doctrine of the Schubert Case would enable the liability of the
other partner to be established independently of the husband's liability. Of course,
the partner who has sustained the entire burden of loss can compel the actual wrong9. Oceanic Steamship Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461,
31 N. E. 987 (1892); see 1 MEcHEM, AENcY (2d ed. 1914) § 1275; cf. 1 RowLEY, PAnTNERSnip (1916) § 382. The actual tortfeasor may be impleaded in an action against the
person legally liable for his negligence. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AT (1923) § 193 (2). The
actual wrongdoer does not thereby become a party to the original controversy and need
enter a defense only to the claim for indemnity. Municipal Service Real Estate Co. v.
D. B. & M. Holding Corp., 257 N. Y. 423, 178 N. E. 745, 78 A. L. R. 327 (1931).
10. See Comment (1935) 4 FODrAm L. RaV. 475, 479.
11. Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882); Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E.
656 (1927).
12. David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 At. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1106 (1932); Wadsworth v.
Wadsworth, 237 App. Div. 319, 261 N. Y. Supp. 670 (3d Dep't 1932) scmble. If the wife
can maintain a personal tort action against her husband, an action against a copartnership
of which he is a member is of course allowed. Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 210 N. W.
822, 48 A. L. R. 293 (1926).
13. See Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Critidsm (1916)
29 HARv. L. REv. 291; 7 UNIFoRM LAWS ANt. (1922) 3; cf. UNIFORM PARnzRasuip Ac
§ 6 (1); N. Y. PARTNERs=p LAW (1919) § 10 (1): "A partnership is an association of two
or more persons . . . "
14. Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N. Y. 182, 155 N. E. 93 (1926); cf. Jacobs v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 198 App. Div. 470, 191 N. Y. Supp. 692 (3d Dep't 1921). Service of all
partners is not necessary, however, in an action sounding in contract. N. Y. CIv. Pmac. AcT.
(1920) § 1197.
15. § 13, N. Y. PARTNERs=n' LAW (1919) § 24.
16. Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 (1932) (infant plaintiff injured
by father, member of partnership); Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 237 App. Div. 319, 261
N. Y. Supp. 670 (3d Dep't 1932) (wife injured by husband-partner).
17. Kopka v. Yockey, 76 Ind. App. 218, 131 N. E. 828 (1921); Haase v. Morton &
Morton, 138 Iowa 205, 115 N. W. 921 (1908); Teague v. Martin, 228 Mass. 458, 117 N. E.
844 (1917); see 1 RowLEY, PARTNRSm'p (1916) § 503; Cf. UNIFORM PARTNERsIip AcT
§ 9, N. Y-. PART7NERSHI LAW (1919) § 20.
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doer to reimburse him.' s The refusal of the court in the instant case to construe
the statute so as to charge the other partner is perhaps attributable to a realization
that to do so "results simply in countenancing an encircling movement where a
frontal attack upon the husband is inhibited."'1
18. U.NmoR PARTNux
-sHp AcT § 18 (a), N. Y. P,%amTrNmsamP LAtv (1919) § 29 (a);
2 RowLEY, PAM=msz
(1916) § 364.
19. Emerson v.Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 185, 216 N. W. 297,
299 (1927).

